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 The different negative events that people experience may threaten distinct forms 
of adaptive functioning. A growing literature on the narrative study of self and well-being 
suggests that one way people may resolve adaptive functioning threats is through 
narrative meaning-making. However, past research shows that meaning-making is not 
always linked to salutary effects. Meaning-making may be most likely to restore adaptive 
functioning when people’s narratives address specific threats associated with specific 
types of negative event. However, we know little about the types of threats that may be 
tied to different negative events. The current studies used an online, experimental, 
repeated measures design to test which types of adaptive functioning threats are linked to 
what types of negative events. Understanding whether particular adaptive functioning 
threats are tied to specific negative events may provide a framework for theorizing about 
the most beneficial types of meanings to be made when narrating specific negative 
events.  
 Participants spent 2 minutes recalling four negative events: actor/competence, 
target/competence, actor/relatedness, target/relatedness (event order was randomized). 
Afterwards, each participant responded to a battery of adaptive functioning measures. 
Study 1 examined these topics in an undergraduate student sample. Study 2 examined 
these topics using a community sample of MTurk workers who ranged from 20 to 69 
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years of age. In addition to testing the extent to which different types of threats arise in 
different types of events, we also tested the extent to which individual differences 
mitigated threat-level perceived. In Study 1, we examined the impact of psychological 
well-being and emotional stability on levels of threat.  
 In Study 2, we also examined age as an individual difference. Different negative 
events led to distinct adaptive functioning threats when individual differences were not 
accounted for. However, the majority of the variance in levels of perceived threat was 
explained by individual differences in well-being, emotional stability, and age. Overall, 
this pattern of findings suggests the importance of idiographic methods for understanding 
how people perceive negative events. Furthermore, the pattern suggests that beneficial 
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 The different negative events we experience in life may have consequences for 
distinct forms of adaptive functioning. For example, the dissolution of a desired romantic 
relationship may threaten a person’s sense of feeling connected to, loved, and desired by 
important others. Failing a college course may threaten a person’s sense of being able to 
competently pursue academic goals. Possibly as an attempt to make meaning, and move 
past such emotionally charged events, people frequently narrate them, expressing them in 
storied form to others (Pasupathi, McLean, & Weeks, 2009; Rime’, Finkenauer, Luminet, 
Zech, & Phillipot, 1998).  
 If the meanings that people make in their narratives address specific threats 
associated with specific negative events, meaning-making may help restore adaptive 
functioning. Yet we know little about whether or not different negative events create 
distinct kinds of adaptive functioning threats and little about the implications of those 
threats for meaning-making. Thus, failing to consider how different events may create 
particular kinds of threats and potentially constrain meaning-making is an important 
limitation to understanding when and why meaning-making “works” for people.  
 The current studies test the idea that distinct negative events may pose distinct 
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adaptive functioning threats. Study 1 examines whether different types of negative events 
are associated with different types of threats using an emerging adult, undergraduate 
student sample. Study 2 tests the same question using a community sample of adults 
ranging from 20 to 69 years of age. In addition to examining the extent to which different 
negative events threaten specific forms of adaptive functioning, these studies explore the 
extent to which individual differences, psychological well-being, and emotional stability 
mitigate threats associated with different negative events. Study 2 also explores whether 
differences in age across adulthood matter for those relationships. Understanding whether 
particular adaptive functioning threats are tied to specific negative events may provide a 
framework for theorizing about the most beneficial types of meanings to be made when 
narrating specific negative events. 
 
 
Defining Adaptive Functioning 
 We take a broad approach to what constitutes adaptive functioning in the current 
studies. We use “adaptive functioning” to refer to a variety of psychologically healthy 
and positive characteristics, like feeling competent. To select specific measures of 
adaptive functioning in the current studies, we drew on past work on agency 
(individualized control and mastery) and communion (connectedness with others). An 
idea that has transcended cultures and time is that adaptive functioning is linked to 
personal agency and communion with others. For example, Wiggins (1991) and 
McAdams and colleagues (1996) trace the idea from Confucianism and pre-Socratic 
traditions of thought, respectively, to modern Western Psychological thought.  
 Much of the past research and theory on agency has focused on the experience of 
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being an individual, differentiated from others, who has intentional strivings for mastery, 
power, and control over situations (Bakan, 1966; Wiggins, 1991). In this framework, 
agency is expressed through self-expansion, self-assertion, and self-protection 
(McAdams, 2001). People’s motivations for self-expansion fuel their agented actions, 
and those motivations are linked to other aspects of self, such as memory for experiences 
and emotions. For example, increased themes of agency in autobiographical narratives 
are positively associated with self-reported personal strivings for attainment of power and 
achievement in every day life (McAdams, Hoffman, Mansfield, & Day, 1996). 
Furthermore, in young men, increased themes of agency are also associated with 
increased anger over unpleasant experiences (McAdams, 1982). From this self-expansion 
manifestation of agency framework, striving for mastery in vocational and achievement-
related activities may provide important contexts from which people experience a sense 
of mastery over the environment and self-expansion.  
 A complementary conceptualization of agency is that people are also responsive 
intentional agents. In this framework, people have agency in the sense that internalized 
cognitive processes are associated with enacting behaviors for self-assertion and self-
protection. However, from the responsive intentional agent framework, it is also argued 
that those cognitions and behaviors cannot be separated from the social norms, roles, 
values, belief systems, and situations that contextualize people’s agency (Pasupathi & 
Winery, 2010; Wellman & Miller, 2006). Thus, agency is “shaped by and responsive to” 
the physical and social situations in which we find ourselves (Wellman & Miller, 2006, p. 
28). Broadening agency to include both the intentional self-expansion and responsive 
agent views suggests multiple forms of adaptive functioning that may be challenged by 
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negative events relating to vocational and achievement oriented activities. Below, we 
refer to those types of negative events as “negative competence events.”  
 In particular, by potentially undermining the link between one’s values and belief 
systems regarding what “should be” attainable by a competent adult (in the U.S. in the 
current studies), we reason that negative competence events might generate a sense of 
self-alienation. To the extent that part of the way one defines the self is with regard to 
accomplishments of personally and socially valued outcomes, negative competence 
events may be associated with feeling alienated from the “true self.”  Because negative 
competence events may violate one’s values and belief systems, we also anticipated that 
they may threaten people’s interest and willingness to engage in psychologically minded 
thought about those events.  
 Negative competence events, which we anticipate having particularly strong ties 
to agency, may be problematic for forms of positive functioning that may generally flow 
from accomplishing desired outcomes in vocational or avocational pursuits. To capture 
such threats in the current studies, we gathered reports on the following measures: 1) 
perceived self-efficacy – the extent to which people are confident in their abilities to face 
and deal with stressors, 2) goal re-engagement – the extent to which people are able to 
define and take actions to accomplish new goals after experiencing goal-related setbacks, 
3) self-alienation – the extent to which an event makes one feel unauthentic and alienated 
from the true self, 4) psychological mindedness-interest – the extent to which individuals 
show an interest in reflecting on the psychological aspects (emotional features and 
cognitive processes) of their own and others’ actions, 5) psychological mindedness-
willingness – the extent to which individuals show willingness to reflect on the 
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psychological aspects (emotional features and cognitive processes) of their own and 
others’ actions, 6) perceived choice – the extent to which people feel that they have 
control/ choice over their actions, and 7) internal locus of control – the extent to which 
people expect that their own characteristics and actions primarily determine desired 
outcomes. 
 Wiggins has argued that communion is the “condition of being part of a larger 
social or spiritual entity, and it is manifested in strivings for intimacy, union, and 
solidarity with a larger entity” (Wiggins, 1991, p. 89). Researchers find that in narratives, 
themes and motives for intimacy are positively associated with striving in the relational 
domain to develop intimacy and closeness with others (Emmons & McAdams, 1991; 
McAdams et al., 1996). In longitudinal research, motivation for intimacy as expressed in 
story themes of warmth and closeness has been associated with better psychosocial 
adjustment in men over a 17-year time frame (McAdams & Vaillant, 1982). To the extent 
that the presence of such themes is linked to actual capacity to secure and maintain 
positive relationships, prioritizing closeness may help one maintain relationships with 
others over time and reap particular benefits associated with having the psychological 
need for connectedness met. However, when things go wrong in the relatedness domain, 
people may experience particular kinds of adaptive functioning threats.  
 Negative relatedness events may be especially problematic for forms of positive 
functioning that may generally flow from feeling related to others. In order to potentially 
capture such threats in the current studies, we gathered reports on the following measures 
(the numbering is continued from above): 8) empathy for others – one’s tendency to take 
the perspective of others and see events from others’ points of view, 9) sense of 
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loneliness – the extent to which one feels socially isolated and lacking in close 
relationships with important others, 10) inclusion of important others in the self – the 
extent to which one conceives of very important others as being closely connected to the 
self as opposed to distanced from the self, 11) perceived self-likeability – the extent to 
which one perceives of the self as being a person that others like, 12) influence of others 
on self – the extent to which expressing the authentic self is constrained by the control or 
influence of others, and 13) motivation to avoid those who have harmed one in the past – 
a subscale of Transgression Related Interpersonal Motivation scale, which assesses 
forgiveness of others (McCullough, Rachal, Sandage, Worthington, Brown, & Hight, 
1998).  
 The avoidance motivation construct assesses the extent to which when one 
imagines a person who caused him or her harm, he or she is motivated to avoid that 
individual as opposed to seeking to repair the relationship. In these studies, we viewed 
being motivated to avoid, as opposed to repair, as a “threat” to adaptive functioning 
because that motivation could limit the future health of the relationship. If the 
relationship is important to the self, avoidance as opposed to repair may be a problem for 
feeling connected to others. However, we review this idea again in the discussion (Study 
2) where we acknowledge that, in some contexts, avoidance motivation may be adaptive. 
 
Systematically Distinguishing Event Types 
 In considering how to test whether different types of negative events threaten 
those distinct forms of adaptive functioning described above, we were challenged on how 
to clearly delineate events as being of one “type” vs. another “type.” There is no widely 
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accepted “event taxonomy” to draw on comparable to the Big Five personality 
framework. We decided that for the current studies, a scheme for distinguishing events 
should 1) provide a clear and theoretically justified case for why and how events would 
differ; 2) provide a way of dividing events that maps on to distinctive threats; and 3) 
provide a division that may elicit consensus, across people, about threats that are specific 
to different events (i.e., is not too idiosyncratic). We sought a situation theory that 
described event-dimensions that would potentially map on to specific types of threats. In 
doing so, we considered the following approaches to understanding situations: The Daily 
Inventory of Stressful Events, differentiating events by emotions, Social Domain Theory, 
Personality of Situations, and Self-Determination Theory. 
 
 
The Daily Inventory of Stressful Events (DISE) Approach 
 
 Almeida, Wethington, and Kessler (2002) introduced the Daily Inventory of 
Stressful Events (DISE) as an interview approach for describing daily stressors (see also 
Almeida, Stawski, & Cichy. 2011). Almeida and colleagues have tried to understand how 
specific “features and events in the daily environment contribute to poorer health” both 
mental and physical (Almeida et al., 2011, p. 1). They seek to capture variability in 
objective threat levels across stressors and between persons.  
 Participants are asked to report on stressors they experience over researcher-
determined time intervals (e.g., days, weeks). Participants report stressor severity and 
what he or she perceived to be at risk in the event. Stressors are then categorized by 
researchers as either interpersonal tensions (e.g., arguments), overloads (e.g., having too 
much to do), or network events (e.g., a close friend’s negative experience). Stressors are 
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then coded into subcategories by researchers within each of those three broad event-
classes. Then, based on semistructured interview responses, each stressor is coded for the 
relative presence of five threat dimensions: loss, danger, disappointment, frustration, and 
opportunity on a 0 (not present) to 3 (clearly present) scale. Each dimension is chosen for 
its anticipated negative impact on well-being (Almeida et al., 2011).  
 The DISE appears to be a powerful tool for describing variability in severity and 
forming a priori determinations about types of threats from different daily stressors. This 
approach seems to meet criterion 1 by arguing for stressors falling naturally into specific 
domains (interpersonal, overloads, network events). Although it provides a way to 
describe threats in those different domains, it does not fully meet criterion 2. This is 
because stressors in different domains may have the same profile of threats. For example, 
financial domain stressors and interpersonal stressor can both result in a sense of loss. 
This approach does not fully serve the goals of the current study. Moreover, the DISE 
approach is consistent with stress and coping theory in focusing on individual attributions 
regarding stressors (Lazarus, 1999). However, it may be overly idiographic in its 
approach and thus not meet the third criterion for potential consensus across people 
regarding what is threatened by different events. This approach may not allow us to fully 
describe whether most people would agree about which specific threats may be tied to 
which specific negative events.  
 
 
Differentiating Events by Emotions 
 
 Researchers have also divided events on the emotions they generate. In one such 
approach, events marked by one type of emotion (e.g., anger) are assumed to differ from 
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events marked by another emotion (e.g., sadness). In such research with both children 
and adults, participants are asked to recall events in which they felt different emotions 
and then to talk about those events either with a parent (Fivush, Berlin, Sales, Mennuti-
Washburn, & Cassidy, 2003) or with the researcher (Habermas, Meier, & Mukhtar, 
2009).  
 Another emotion-based approach suggests that emotions may be linked to events 
through event-related changes in goal states (Stein & Levine, 1990). In this approach, an 
event in which pursuit of an important goal is blocked by someone else’s actions results 
in different emotions than the loss of something desired. Stein and Levine find that such 
event features have different repercussions, in terms of experienced anger and sadness 
especially. People experience anger when something is perceived as aversive, 
unavoidable, and has its root cause in a human agent, as opposed to a natural 
environmental event (Stein & Levine, 1989). People experience sadness regarding events 
in which a desired goal is lost, especially as a result of a natural event, and sadness may 
be especially likely when one cannot reinstate the lost goal (Stein & Levine, 1989). These 
findings suggest that events that elicit anger and those that elicit sadness may have 
distinctive features. They also suggest that both types of events may threaten one’s 
autonomy because goal achievement is blocked. 
 The emotions approach may meet criterion 1 by specifying features that 
distinguish events along emotions. However, it may not meet criterion 2 (events 
correspond to specific threats) or 3 (consensus among people) very well. For example, an 
event characterized by anger and one characterized by sadness could be equally likely to 
be associated with threats to self-efficacy. Furthermore past work on emotional 
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complexity suggests that consequential negative autobiographical events are likely to 
elicit multiple emotions (as opposed to singular emotional states, like “pure” sadness), 
and this is especially true for older adults (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 
2000). Research has also established that people differ in the emotion regulation 
strategies they use (Gross & John 2003; Ray, Wilhelm & Gross, 2008). Some people may 
use strategies that are more effective than others. That may result in ostensibly similar 
types of events being threatening in different ways for different people. Thus, although 
past work suggests that we can divide events by emotions, it is not an approach that 
clearly meets current criteria. 
 
 
The Social Domain Theory Approach 
 
 Domain theorists argue that social interactions may be fundamentally distinct 
kinds of experiences (hitting someone vs. calling a teacher by her first name; Turiel, 
1983). Domain theorists posit that events can be categorized as moral, conventional, 
personal, or prudential. They also acknowledge that some events and situations involve 
multifaceted issues.  
 Intrinsic to events in the moral domain are issues of fairness, justice, and harm. 
For example, a girl who pushes a boy off of a swing and makes him cry because she 
wants to swing knows by virtue of perceiving the consequences to the victim (physical 
harm and crying) that her behavior was morally wrong. Events that fall in the 
conventional domain may also be construed as wrong but not on moral grounds. They are 
wrong because they violate a norm that has been determined by fiat through generally 
agreed upon standards. Events that fall in the personal issues domain include the types of 
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clothes one chooses to wear, matters of privacy, or the music to which one chooses to 
listen. Events that fall in the prudential domain involve issues bearing on how people 
treat themselves, such as choosing healthy behaviors or harming one’s self. Events that 
are multifaceted include issues that combine concerns (Smetana, Tasopoulos-Chan, 
Tasopoulos-Chan, Gettman, & Campione-Barr, 2009). 
 The Social Domain Theory approach meets criterion 1 (a clear and theoretically 
justified case for why and how events would differ). Indeed, Turiel (1983) presents a 
compelling argument suggesting that there may be consensus regarding the types of 
events that fall in the moral domain. Similarly, Gray, Young, and Waytz (2012) argue 
that the morality vs. immorality of an act is determined by whether or not harm was 
visited upon a moral patient (one who can experience suffering) by an intentional agent 
(one who seeks to cause harm). Gray and colleagues argue that via this dyadic “universal 
cognitive template,” all typically functioning adults could agree on whether an act lies 
within the moral domain or outside of the moral domain. From this framework, people 
may share an essential understanding of what types of events are moral, but this theory 
has little to say about the negative implications for the self (threats to adaptive 
functioning) for events that fall outside of the moral domain.  
 For the current studies, using theories that divide events on moral grounds is 
problematic given criterion 2 (events correspond to specific threats). For Domain Theory, 
this is because events that fall within a given domain may be broad in their features, and 
consequently may not be linked to specific types threats for the moral agent (the 
individual causing the harm). For example, negative events in the personal domain could 
make one feel either overly influenced by others (such as when parents dictate clothing 
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choices to adolescents), lonely and isolated (such as when a good friend criticizes the 
music one listens to), or both, depending on the exact details of the event. 
There is also a potential problem for criterion 3 (consensus among people). Research 
indicates that there is variability between people in assignment of domain to social issues 
depending on informational assumptions (Wainryb, 1991), ideological beliefs 
(Smetana,1981), and age (Smetana,1988). Likewise, some work on moral intuitions 
theory suggests people may disagree about the moral vs. immoral nature of events in 
terms of basic moral concepts (Haidt & Hersh, 2001), and even Gray and colleagues 
(2012) present evidence suggesting that individual differences in perceiving the minds of 




The Personality of Situations Approach 
 
 In creating a “personality of situations approach,” Funder and colleagues argue 
that if we knew the psychologically relevant details of the situation and the psychological 
profile of an individual in the situation, we would be able to predict that person’s 
behavior in that situation (Funder, 2008). Focusing on understanding differences between 
situations, Funder and colleagues conceptualize the “personality of situations” as 
researchers have conceptualized descriptive personality attributes. They use the Riverside 
Situational Q-Sort technique (Wagerman & Funder, 2009) to obtain aggregated ratings of 
the relevance of the psychological characteristics associated with particular situations. 
Situations are differentiated in terms of the expression of personality characteristics they 
create (Wagerman & Funder, 2009).  
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 Funder and colleagues find that some situations that map onto personality 
characteristics give rise to distinct forms of affect. Thus, some negative events may 
threaten emotional well-being differently than others. Otherwise, this approach tells us 
little about the threats inherent in different events. Beyond learning the degree to which 
different events can be characterized by negative emotional experiences, which may fit 
criterion 2 (events corresponding to certain threats), this approach does not readily meet 
criterion 1 (divides negative events clearly) or criterion 3 (consensus among people). 
Although this may be a very fruitful approach for creating taxonomy of situations, it is 
not as helpful for tying specific events to specific threats.    
 
 
The Approach That Appears to Meet All Three Criteria: 
Self-Determination Theory 
 Self-determination theorists posit three psychological needs: autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness. These needs are argued to be universal, innate requirements 
for human functioning (Deci & Ryan, 2000). When they are met, people are expected to 
function more adaptively than when they are not met. Thus, in functional terms, the three 
psychological needs are conceptualized as “qualities of experience that are essential to 
any person’s well-being…that replenish psychological energy” (Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 
1996, p. 1277).  
 Autonomy refers to feeling that one’s actions flow from the self and are 
intrinsically and volitionally determined. Because past research suggests that fulfilling 
the need for competence can contribute to feeling autonomous (e.g., Ryan, 1995), we 
only focus on the relatedness and competence dimensions of negative events below. 
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Thus, autonomy is not discussed further. Relatedness refers to the extent to which one 
feels meaningfully connected to others, including a sense that others recognize and value 
one’s authentic self. Competence refers to perceiving one’s self as effective, capable, and 
as able to consistently bring about desired outcomes through one’s own actions.   
Different negative events may create distinct types of threats if they foreground 
relatedness or competence needs. That is, people’s basic psychological needs may 
contextualize events by creating the potential for certain kinds of threats as opposed to 
other kinds of threats. Moreover, negative relatedness foregrounding events may broadly 
threaten communion-related forms of adaptive functioning (e.g., feeling important others 
are included in the self). Negative competence foregrounding events may broadly 
threaten agency-related forms of adaptive functioning (e.g., sense of self-efficacy).  
This line of reasoning is supported by research which indicates that whereas fulfillment 
of the need for relatedness is associated with better relational functioning (e.g., less 
loneliness and social isolation), fulfillment of competence needs are not associated with 
better relational functioning (Patrick, Knee, Canavello, & Lonsbary, 2007). Indeed, by 
definition, negative relatedness-foregrounding events should present problems for feeling 
that one is meaningfully linked to others.  
 The need for competence broadly captures the extent to which people feel 
“optimally challenged in the domains of life one engages and thus is able to express 
effectiveness and agency” (Ryan & La Guardia, 2000, p. 163). Events that fulfill one’s 
need for competence lead people to feel confident and effective in action (Ryan & Deci, 
2002), whereas experiences that challenge competence are associated with lower 
perceived self-worth (Deci, Schwartz, Scheinman, & Ryan, 1981). When the need for 
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competence is frustrated, people are especially likely to feel helpless and unmotivated to 
achieve goals, suggesting a clear link to agency-related outcomes (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
Thus, it may be the case that events that jeopardize one’s sense of competence present 
problems for agency-related forms of adaptive functioning like a sense of efficacy, or the 
desire to re-engage in goal pursuit after setbacks.  
 Compared to the other possible ways of dividing events, self-determination theory 
appears to be the most useful framework for the current studies and it most clearly meets 
all three criteria noted above. Indeed, as Ryan and La Guardia (2000) explain, when the 
psychological needs are “frustrated or neglected in a specific domain or in general, 
individuals will show motivational or psychological decrements of a specifiable nature” 
(p. 150). 
 We expected that negative events that foregrounded relatedness vs. competence 
needs would be associated with challenges to specific forms of adaptive functioning. 
Compared to negative relatedness events, we expected that negative competence events 
would be associated with greater threats to the agency-related forms of adaptive 
functioning described above (perceived self-efficacy, goal re-engagement, self-alienation, 
psychological mindedness-interest and willingness, perceived choice, and internal locus 
of control).  
 Compared to negative competence events, we expected that negative relatedness 
events would be associated with greater threats to communion-related forms of adaptive 
functioning (empathy for others, greater loneliness, inclusion of important others in the 
self, perceived self-likeability, influence of others on self, and avoidance motivation). 
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Actor vs. Target 
 
 In addition to basic needs, another essential dimension that events may differ on is 
whether one was the actor who did or said something that contributed to the event turning 
negative, or was the target of such an act (much of that work focuses on experiences of 
causing harm or being harmed). Notably, being a bystander is another category in this 
dimension of perspective on event, but it is not considered in the proposed study. This is 
because the narrative literature focuses heavily on personally experienced events. 
Although bystander events could be viewed as such, they are not typically an explicit 
focus in narrative work.  
 Research on the agent/target perspectives suggests that they are more relevant, 
critical features of events in regards to potential implications for discerning threats. 
However, future research may examine the bystander perspective in the context of 
specific threats. Thus, the basic agent/target approach is reflected in the dyadic cognitive 
template on moral judgments described by Gray and colleagues (2012). Other work 
examining how people narrate perpetration and victimization suggests that negative 
events differ when one is the actor vs. target.  
 Researchers have found that in general, people tell different kinds of stories about 
their own perpetration and victimization events by highlighting different kinds of 
information (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Stillwell & Baumeister 1997; 
Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005). This raises the possibility that events are perceived 
differently if one is in the actor vs. target role. In turn, that suggests that there may be 
specific types of threats related to being an actor vs. being the target. 
  Perpetrators of harm (those in the actor role) highlight information that makes 
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them appear to be reasonable social agents. In a study with adults, 52% of perpetrator 
narratives featured a positive end to a story about harming someone else whereas only 
29% of victim narratives did. Likewise, 68% of perpetrator narratives included 
information about external or mitigating circumstances whereas only 20% of 
victimization narratives did (Baumeister et al., 1990). Perpetrators tell stories that have a 
dual perspective, which includes a high degree of information about their own intentions 
as well as the emotions they perceive that the victim experienced (Wainryb et al., 2005).  
 Although perpetrators may be motivated to include this information in narratives 
to make themselves look reasonable (Baumeister et al., 1990; Stillwell & Baumeister, 
1997), they may also include it because the dual perspective is a unique feature of 
causing harm (Wainryb et al., 2005). For example, one’s intentions may be relevant 
features of a perpetration experience because whether one intended to cause harm vs. did 
not intend to cause harm will matter for how that individual experiences and makes sense 
of his or her own actions and the consequences for the victim. Indeed, seeing someone 
else hurting because of something one has done is disturbing and is a definitional piece of 
causing harm.  
 Thus, when one’s actions lead to harm, it makes sense that intentions are the focus 
of the narrative because they were central to the experience. When victims talk about 
being harmed by someone else, they focus on the internal experience of being harmed 
rather than focusing on the psychological states of the perpetrator. In contrast to being the 
actor who causes someone else harm, being the victim appears to generate a more unified 
perspective on the event.  
 The difference in event characteristics associated with being the actor or target 
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could lead to distinct types of threats to adaptive functioning. Research on the actor/target 
dimension in experiences of interpersonal harm suggests that role in the event may be 
associated with different kinds of threats. People’s memories of perpetrating harm are 
characterized by shame and guilt whereas their memories of being victims of harm are 
characterized by anger, anxiety, sadness, and fear (Mansfield, McLean, & Lilgendahl, 
2010). Hence, events in which one’s own actions caused the harm are associated with a 
different emotional profile than events in which one was the target of harm. The different 
emotional profiles may suggest unique psychological threats related to causing harm and 
being harmed.  
 For example, shame is associated with negative judgments about the self and 
social withdrawal (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Experiencing shame may 
suggest that one has “over-identified” with causing harm and views the self as bad or 
damaged in some lasting way (Lilgendahl, McLean, & Mansfield, 2013) and that may be 
maladaptive. Being the actor in such negative events may make it especially challenging 
to want to be psychologically minded about one’s actions and grapple with the meaning 
of the negative event, especially if the event is linked to shame. Such events could 
threaten positive self-regard and lead one to feel inauthentic or alienated from the true 
self. 
 Being the target of interpersonal harm may result in other distinct challenges to 
adaptive functioning. In one study regarding how people narrate traumatic events, 
approximately half (47.7%) of the victim narratives included statements about how the 
event led to the self being damaged in some lasting way (Lilgendahl et al., 2013). Janoff-
Bulman noted that one consequence of victimization is a global sense that the universe is 
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unjust and unkind (1985). That sense that the world or others are unjust may make it 
challenging to empathize with others. Furthermore, given that the negative target event 
was unsought, yet went unavoided, it may threaten a person’s sense of being able to 
control events. It is possible that this notion feeds the anxiety feature of victimization 
events. Thus, unlike negative events in which one was the actor, negative events in which 
one was the target may undermine a sense that one has control over life outcomes, may 
give rise to feeling like others have an undue influence on the self, and may be associated 
with diminished empathy for others.  
 We expected that negative events in which one is the actor vs. the target might be 
associated with challenges to different forms of adaptive functioning. Compared to 
negative target events, we anticipated that negative actor events would be associated with 
challenges to positive self-evaluation (like self-efficacy), would undermine psychological 
mindedness-interest and psychological mindedness-willingness, would be associated with 
greater self-alienation, and a diminished desire to re-engage with new goals.  
 Compared to negative actor events, we expected that negative target events may 
threaten one’s sense of being able to control outcomes in life, make one feel unduly under 




Implications of Role Being Crossed With 
Foregrounded Needs 
 Crossing the Actor/Target dimension with Competence/Relatedness dimension 
leads to four negative events: 1) Actor/Competence – a time one did something to harm 
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his or her sense of competence, 2) Target/Competence – a time someone else did 
something to harm one’s sense of competence, 3) Actor/Relatedness – a time one did 
something to harm an important relationship, 4) Target/Relatedness – a time someone 
else did something to harm an important relationship. 
 These four types of events may differ in the extent to which they create threats to 
adaptive functioning. Actor/competence events may be associated with higher levels of 
threats to self-efficacy than the other three events. Actor/competence events may be 
challenging for people in the sense that they may lead one to feel responsible for failing 
at an achievement-oriented goal. Actor/competence events may be more challenging to 
one’s sense of efficacy than target/competence events because in target competence 
events, it is possible that one may still retain some sense that he or she can accomplish 
the goal despite what the other individual claims about the self. Actor/competence events 
may be more strongly threatening to self-efficacy than actor/relatedness or 
target/relatedness events because relatedness events, which inherently involve the 
interaction of one’s own goals, desires, and needs with the goals, desires, and needs of 
another, may not be perceived as being as much under one’s own control as competence-
related events. Competence events may be viewed as particularly tied to one’s personal 
skills and abilities that can be practiced and developed. 
 Being the target of a negative relatedness event may be associated with greater 
loneliness than the other three events. Negative events in the relatedness domain should 
be especially likely to be linked to feelings of social isolation. Because being the target in 
such an event may lead people to feel strongly rejected or unable to change the situation, 
target/relatedness events may be more likely than actor/relatedness events to create a 
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sense of loneliness. Further, target/relatedness events should be more linked to loneliness 
than either actor/competence or target/competence events because competence events 




The Role of Individual Differences in 
Determining Threats 
 The stress and coping approach to negative life events suggests that threats arise 
(or fail to) when an individual appraises the extent to which his or her own personal 
characteristics can meet the demands of the event. Lazarus and Folkman (1987) argue 
that threat is “not solely a property of the person or the environment; it requires the 
conjunction of an environment having certain attributes with a particular kind of person 
who will react with threat when exposed to the environmental attributes. The concept of 
threat actually loses its meaning when applied to an environment without regard to the 
person who transacts with it…” (p. 142). Consequently, in the current studies, we deemed 
it important to examine the extent to which individual differences relate to perceived 
event threats. This approach also speaks to calls in the “post person-situation debate” era 
of personality psychology to account for “which aspects of person’s and which aspects of 
situations (specifically) affect which behaviors” (Funder, 2008, p. 577).  
 Psychological well-being and emotional stability may be two individual 
differences that are especially relevant for the extent to which individuals perceive threats 
to adaptive functioning. Psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989) assesses people’s sense of 
leading a meaningful and pleasurable life. As a resource that may support overall 
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functioning, high (versus low) well-being may protect people from feeling threatened by 
negative life events. We have found that individuals who scored high on psychological 
well-being are more likely to narrate growth-promoting stories of interpersonal 
transgressions than individuals who scored low on well-being (Mansfield, Pasupathi & 
McLean, 2015). One explanation of this finding is that well-being may create a 
cognitive/emotional framework that makes it less threatening for individuals to reflect on 
such negative events.  
 Individual differences in emotional stability may also matter for perceived threat. 
More emotionally stable people (low neuroticism) are at decreased risk for a variety of 
negative psychological outcomes. They report experiencing fewer daily stressors, fewer 
negative outcomes from the stressors they do experience, and less contamination of mood 
from past negative events (Suls & Martin, 2005). Indeed, whereas high emotional 
stability may be protective against a variety of threats to self from negative events, low 
emotional stability, which is characterized by a preponderance of negative emotionality 
and negative cognitions about life events, could predispose people to perceiving high 
levels of threats from negative life events. In support of this idea, researchers have shown 
that even controlling for average valence of the events selected to be told in one’s life 
story, people who scored low on emotional stability (high neuroticism) were less likely to 
positively interpret the impact of life events on self (Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011).   
Generally, psychological well-being and emotional stability are positively correlated 
(negatively if emotional stability is conceptualized as neuroticism). Conceptually, they 
are distinct.  
 Whereas psychological well-being (a measure of eudaimonic functioning; Ryff & 
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Singer, 2008) taps the extent to which people conceive of their lives as being fulfilling, 
pleasurable, associated with growth, purpose, and mastery over the environment, 
emotional stability centers around the extent to which people are consistent in an overall 
positive, optimistic mindset vs. an overall negative, pessimistic mindset. Because of these 
conceptual differences, we plan to keep the constructs distinct in analyses though the 
ultimate decision will depend on the extent of the correlations in the samples.   
 Recall that the current studies seek to determine the extent to which distinct 
negative events (e.g., being the actor in a negative relatedness foregrounding event as 
opposed to being the target in a negative competence foregrounding event) map on to 
particular kinds of bad outcomes, which we refer to as adaptive functioning threats. The 
primary question addressed whether most people agree that different kinds of bad events 
lead to different kinds of adaptive functioning threats. If so, meaning-making may be 
















 We used a 2 (actor, target) by 2 (competence, relatedness) design to elicit 
memories of 4 event types: 1) actor/competence, 2) target/competence, 3) 
actor/relatedness, and 4) target/relatedness. After thinking of each event, participants 
responded to a battery of adaptive functioning measures expected to broadly map on to 
agency-related and communion-related variables that we reviewed earlier. This design 
allowed us to assess whether events in which one was the actor vs. target and that 
foregrounded either the basic psychological need for competence or relatedness were 





Main Effects of Foregrounded Psychological Needs (Competence/Relatedness) 
on Adaptive Functioning 
 We anticipated that there would be more challenges to self-efficacy, goal re-
engagement, self-alienation, psychological mindedness-interest, psychological 
mindedness-willingness, having an internal locus of control, and perceived choice in 
negative competence events than negative relatedness events. We anticipated that there 
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would be greater challenges to empathy for others, greater sense of loneliness, greater 
challenges to inclusion of others in self, perceived self-likeability, influence of others on 




Main Effects of Role (Actor/Target) on Adaptive Functioning 
 
 We anticipated that there would be more challenges to self-efficacy, goal re-
engagement, self-alienation, psychological mindedness-interest, psychological 
mindedness-willingness, and perceived likeability in negative actor events than negative 
target events. 
 We anticipated that there would be more challenges to perceived choice, locus of 
control, empathy for others, greater loneliness, greater influence of others on self, and 
avoidance motivation in negative target events than negative actor events. 
 
 
Interactions of Foregrounded Psychological Need (Competence/Relatedness) 
and Role (Actor/Target) on Adaptive Functioning 
 We anticipated that actor/competence events would be associated with higher 
levels of threats to self-efficacy than the other three events. We expected this because of 
the agentic, goal-oriented nature of competence events and the fact that being in the actor 
role may be associated with people being likely to perceive the self as a “failure.” We 
anticipated that target/relatedness events would be associated with higher loneliness than 
the other events. We expected this because negative events in the relatedness domain may 
be especially likely to be linked to feelings of social isolation and because being the 
   
	  
26
target in such an event may lead people to feel especially rejected. 
 
Main Effect of Well-Being and Emotional Stability 
on Threats to Adaptive Functioning 
 We expected that individuals who scored high on well-being and emotional 
stability would report the lowest threats to adaptive functioning across the four negative 







 Undergraduates (n = 183) from the psychology participant pool at the University 
of Utah participated for 1.5 hours of course credit. Four participants were dropped from 
the sample for not completing large portions of the data (see Appendix A for information 
about sample and data preparation). We examined the remaining 179 participants’ 
responses to three memory anchors for each of the four events in order to determine 
whether participants nominated an event that matched the prompt. For example, when 
prompted for actor/competence, we examined the anchor items to assess whether the 
participant caused the negative event and whether the negative event would have 
foregrounded the psychological need for competence. Of 179 participants, 125 provided 
anchors that matched all prompted events and 54 failed to provide anchors that matched 
at least one prompted event (see results section on manipulation check for further details). 
In the final sample, we included only those 125 who provided anchors that matched all 
memory prompts. 
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 The final 125 participants did not differ from the other 54 participants on 
conscientiousness t(177) = -.12, p = .91, neuroticism t(177) = -.12, p = .90, openness to 
experience t(177) = .54, p = .59, extraversion t(177) = .74, p = .46, agreeableness t(177) = 
-.59, p = .55, trait hostility t(177) = .60, p = .55, or psychological well-being t(177) = -
.84, p = .40.  
 Reducing sample size creates costs in terms of our power to detect statistically 
significant effects. To determine our achieved power given our reduction in sample size 
to 125 participants, we conducted post hoc analyses for repeated measures MANOVA 
using G*power 3.0 (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996), given an alpha of .05. We 
estimated effects using the F test family. Our analyses indicated that when testing within- 
subjects effects on our dependent variables, we had power of .98 to detect a Cohen’s f2 
effect size of .02, which is a small effect size according to Cohen (1988). When we 
estimated power to detect between-subjects effects (e.g., testing whether men and women 
differed on types of threats by events) in our repeated measures design, our power to 
detect the same small effect (Cohen’s f 2 = .02) was reduced to .56. In sum, it is unlikely 
that we will miss an effect if it is present when we test within-subjects effects but more 
likely when examining between-subjects effects for factors like gender that have two 
levels.  
 The final sample of 125 participants (female = 84) had an average age of 22.46 
(SD = 4.10). Of those participants, 0.8% reported being African American, 8.8% Asian 
American, 50.4% European American, 8.0 % Latino American, 1.6% chose not to 
disclose, 20.8% chose Other as their ethnicity, and 9.6% chose multiple ethnicities.  
 
 





Overview of Online Survey 
 The study was listed in an online system for signing up for course credits at the 
University of Utah. Potential participants read the following description of the study 
online:  
 This study examines how different types of negative events relate to 
different types of challenges. The results of this study will advance our 
understanding of what stressors are linked to what types of experiences. 
We are doing this study because knowing this information will help us 
understand why some forms of coping work for some types of negative 
events but not others. You will be asked to think about and report on how 
different types of difficult experiences made you think and feel.  
 Those who were interested in participating then clicked a link to the survey. The 
survey was presented in 7 major blocks. Block 1 of the survey included completion of 
consent, demographics, and individual differences questionnaires.  
 As part of consent (see Appendix B), participants were informed that the survey 
would require approximately 1.5 hours to complete, that participation was voluntary, and 
that choosing not to finish the survey or omitting any question that the person preferred 
not to answer would not result in penalty or loss of benefit. Participants consented by 
clicking the next button on the survey after reading the following:  
By clicking next below and returning this questionnaire, you are giving 
your consent to participate... If you don't want to participate simply log 
out and close your browser. Thank you very much!  
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 When participants clicked next, they were taken to a demographics page in which 
we collected age, gender, and information about ethnicity. Then participants completed 
individual differences measures (the Big Five Inventory, Trait Hostility, and 
Psychological Well-being, as described in Measures), which we presented in random 
order.  
 In Blocks 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the study, participants were prompted to recall four 
different negative life events (actor/competence, target/competence, actor/relatedness, 
target/relatedness, see Appendix C for prompts). They were asked to spend 2 minutes 
vividly imagining those events and to respond to questions about those events after the 2-
minute period (described in detail below). Then before moving on to the next block, 
participants engaged in a between-event filler task. Participants were asked to choose 
which of 4 pictures he or she considered the most 1) pleasant, 2) peaceful, 3) exciting, 4) 
interesting, and 5) mysterious. The photos were drawn from emotionally neutral pictures 
in the International Affective Picture Scale. We chose those pictures as an attempt to 
return participants to an emotionally neutral state after having thought about each 
negative event to reduce the potential for carryover effects. After completing the final 
picture ratings, in Block 6, participants were prompted to write narratives of the negative 
events (event order was again randomized). After completing the final narrative in Block 
7, participants were debriefed.  
 
Example Survey Walkthrough  
 After completing Block 1, participants were randomly assigned to recall one of 
the four negative events. The example that follows is based on the participant being 
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prompted to recall an actor/competence event. The prompt would have appeared as 
follows:  
Now I want you to think of a time when you did or said something that 
negatively affected your sense of competence in an area that is important 
to you. I want you think of a time when it was your own actions that led to 
this outcome. 
The participant would have then been asked to provide some details about that event to 
anchor his or her memory: 
1. Now please briefly state when it happened (the approximate date if you can recall 
it). 
2. Now please briefly state who was involved. 
3. Now please briefly state what you did in this event. 
 Responses to items 1 and 2 were limited to 75 characters. Responses to item 3 
were limited to 200 characters. Length of response was limited to exclude the possibility 
that some participants would provide a lengthy narrative of the event, whereas others 
would not. After completing item 3 (briefly stating what the participant did in the event), 
the participant clicked “next” and saw the following prompt: 
Now spend TWO minutes imagining that you are back in the most intense 
moment of that event. Just stay in that moment for a while and vividly 
imagine that experience again. After two minutes pass you will be able 
click next and move past this page to the next page of the survey. 
The Qualtrics survey was designed such that participants could not advance their 
browsers to the next page of the survey until 2 minutes had passed. This 2-minute period 
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was included to standardize the amount of time that all participants spent imagining the 
prompted events.  
 Participants then completed two items as a manipulation check. One item assessed 
the degree to which the participant perceived of the self as incompetent after imagining 
the event. The other assessed the degree to which the participant perceived him or her self 
as lacking social relatedness after imagining the event (see Measures). We anticipated 
that if participants had been imagining a negative, competence foregrounding event, they 
would score higher on the competence measure than the relatedness measure. In contrast, 
we expected that when participants had been imagining a negative, relatedness 
foregrounding event, they would score higher on the relatedness measure than the 
competence measure.  
 Next, using a 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) Likert-type scale, the participant 
reported the degree to which he or she experienced six different negative emotions after 
imagining the event (see Measures). Using the same scale, participants then responded to 
one item assessing the extent to which it was difficult for him or her to vividly imagine 
the event and one item assessing how much effort he or she put forth imagining the event 
(see Measures). We gathered these measures to explore whether the events systematically 
differed in difficulty and effort required to imagine them. 
 Next, using a 1 (not at all true) to 5 (completely true) Likert-type scale, the 
participant reported on the extent to which imagining the first event, in this example 
actor/competence, made him or her feel threatened on 14 different forms of adaptive 
functioning. The order of presentation of adaptive functioning scales was randomized. 
Each adaptive functioning scale was calculated such that higher scores represented 
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greater levels of threat.  
 After the participant responded to the final adaptive functioning measure, the 
participant completed the picture rating filler task. Once done with the filler task, the 
participant moved on to the second (randomly assigned) negative event prompt and the 
steps in the example above were repeated. Participants followed those same steps in 
recalling the third and fourth events. After the fourth event, the participant was asked to 
provide narratives of the events (event presentation was randomized, see Appendix D for 
narrative prompts). After the final narrative, the participant clicked “next” and saw a 
debriefing page describing the goals of the study. See Appendix E for a complete list of 





 We used the Psychological Well-being (Ryff, 1989), which is a widely used, 
Likert-type measure that has good test-retest reliability and displays convergent validity 
with measures like internal control, self-esteem, and life satisfaction, and positive and 
negative affectivity (Ryff, 1989). Participants provided responses on a 1 (strongly 
disagree) - 6 (strongly agree) scale that measures six dimensions of psychological well-
being. Examples from the subscales include, “In general, I feel confident and positive 
about myself” (self-acceptance); “In general, I feel that I continue to learn more about 
myself as time goes by” (personal growth); “I feel good when I think of what I've done in 
the past and what I hope to do in the future” (purpose in life); “Most people see me as 
loving and affectionate” (positive relations with others); “My decisions are not usually 
influenced by what everyone else is doing” (autonomy); and “In general, I feel I am in 
   
	  
33
charge of the situation in which I live” (environmental mastery). Internal consistency of 
the subscales were high in the current study, self-acceptance, α = .85; personal growth, α 
= .80; purpose in life, α = .81; positive relations with others, α = .85; autonomy, α = .80; 
environmental mastery, α = .82; and at the overall level, α = .94. 
 To assess personality, we used the Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999). 
The Big Five Inventory is a 44-item self-report measure of individuals’ standings on five 
dimensions of personality: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness to 
experience, and neuroticism. The Big Five Inventory displays desirable psychometric 
properties (including good internal consistency of subscales and the test-retest reliability 
of the subscales equals or is greater than .80 over 3 months). For each of the 44 test 
items, participants provide responses on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
Likert-type scale of the extent to which the characteristic describes himself or herself. 
Example items include the following: “Is Talkative” (extraversion); “Is helpful and 
unselfish with others” (agreeableness); “Does a thorough job” (conscientiousness); “Is 
depressed, blue” (neuroticism); and  “Is original, comes up with new ideas” (openness to 
experience). Internal consistency of the subscales were adequate in the current study, 
extraversion, α =.85; agreeableness, α =.80; conscientiousness, α = 78; neuroticism, α 
=.84, and openness to Experience, α =.82. 
 Participants then completed Likert-type self-report questionnaire ratings assessing 
a variety of distinct forms of adaptive functioning after thinking about four different 
negative events. Below we list and describe the measures as they were introduced earlier 
in broad conjunction with their relationships to agency and communion. Each scale listed 
was limited to the three items that displayed the highest factor loadings in the scale 
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overall and that made the most sense for the current study.  
 Recall that the current study assesses the extent to which events that differ on role 
(actor/target) and foregrounded psychological need (competence/relatedness) threaten 
distinct forms of adaptive functioning. Note, however, that some of these “adaptive 
functioning” measures that we used (our dependent variables) focused on positive 
psychological characteristics (e.g., perceived likeability of self) whereas others focused 
on negative psychological outcomes or experiences (e.g., degree of loneliness). Scales 
that focused on positive psychological characteristics were reverse scored. Consequently, 
higher scores on all scales represented higher magnitude of threat to adaptive functioning. 
For example, high scores on perceived likeability of self represent greater threats to 
perceived likeability of self. Alpha values presented below are for participants’ responses 
to each scale after thinking about the actor/competence, target/competence, 
actor/relatedness, target/relatedness events, respectively.  
 We used the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) to 
assess perceived efficacy. This widely used scale assesses the degree to which people are 
confident in their ability to face difficulty after experiencing stressful events. The three 
items used from this scale were (α = .89, .89, .89, .89): 
1. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I can manage to solve difficult 
problems if I try hard enough.” 
2. “After thinking about this event, I realize that it is easy for me to stick to my aims 
and accomplish my goals.” 
3. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I am confident that I could deal 
efficiently with unexpected events.” 
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 We used the Goal Re-engagement Scale (see Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & 
Carver, 2003) to assess the extent to which when faced with the knowledge that a sought 
after goal is unattainable, individuals are able to define a new meaningful goal and take 
actions to meet it. The three items from this scale we used were (α = .92, .92, .94, .93): 
1. “After thinking about this event, I can convince myself that I have other 
meaningful goals to pursue.”  
2. “After thinking about this event, I realize it is easy for me to start working on 
other new goals.”  
3. “After thinking about this event, it is then easy for me to seek other meaningful 
goals.”  
 We used the Self-Alienation subscale of The Authenticity Scale (see Wood, 
Linly, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008) to measure perceived dispositional 
authenticity. The three items from the self-alienation scale were (α = .89, .89, .92, .90):  
1. “After thinking about this event, I feel as if I don’t know myself very well.” 
2. “After thinking about this event, I feel out of touch with the real me.” 
3. “After thinking about this event, I feel alienated from myself.” 
 We used the Psychological Mindedness-Interest in Meaning and Motivation for 
One’s Own and Other’s Behavior scale (see Conte, Rasson, & Karusa, 1996) to assess the 
extent to which individuals show a willingness, interest in, and capacity to reflect on the 
meanings of affective and intellectual psychological processes. In factor analytic work, 
Conte et al. (1996) found that the scale was composed of five related but unique factors. 
We chose the following single item from the Psychological Mindedness-Interest 
subscale, which assesses the extent to which people are curious about understanding their 
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own and others’ behavior: 
1. “After thinking about this event, I tend to wonder what made me act in a certain 
way.” 
 We used one item from the Psychological Mindedness-Willingness to Try to 
Understand One’s Self and Others (see Conte, Rasson, & Karusa, 1996) Scale. We chose 
the single item with the highest factor loading from the Psychological Mindedness-
Willingness subscale, which assesses the extent to which people are willing to engage in 
psychologically minded thought in order to understand their own and others’ behavior:   
1. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I don’t want to delve too deeply 
into my feelings.” 
 We used three items from the Perceived Choice (see Sheldon & Deci, 1996) scale 
to assess the extent to which people feel that they function in a self-determined, 
autonomous way. The perceived choice subscale assess the extent to which people feel 
that they have control and “choicefulness” over their actions (Sheldon, Ryan & Reyes, 
1996, p. 1273). The three items we used were (α = .85, .86, .85, .86):  
1. “After thinking about this event, I realize I always choose the things I do.” 
2. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I choose to do the things that I have 
to do.” 
3. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I choose to do the things I do 
because they interest me.” 
 We used three items from the Multidimensional Locus of Control – Internal 
subscale (Levenson, 1981) to assess the extent to which people expect that their own 
characteristics and actions (as opposed to external factors fate, and powerful others) will 
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lead to desired outcomes. The three items used from the Internal Locus of Control 
subscale were (α = .80, .83, .83, .86): 
1. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I can pretty much determine what 
will happen in my life.” 
2. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I am usually able to protect my 
personal interests.” 
3. “After thinking about this event, I realize that when I make plans, I am almost 
certain to make them work.” 
 We used three items from the Perspective Taking subscale of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (see Davis, 1980). The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) is a 
multidimensional measure of individual differences in the construct empathy. The IRI has 
four subscales. We used the perspective taking subscale of the IRI, which assess 
“spontaneous attempts to adopt the perspectives of other people and see things from their 
point (sic) of view” (Davis, 1980, p. 2). The three items we used were (α = .91, .92, .91, 
.90): 
1. “After thinking about this event, I realize that there are two sides to every 
question and I tend to try to look at them both.” 
2. “After thinking about this event, I realize that when I'm upset at someone, I 
usually try to ‘put myself in his/her shoes’ for a while.” 
3. “After thinking about this event, I realize that before criticizing somebody, I try to 
imagine how I would feel if I were in his/her place.” 
 We used three items from the UCLA Loneliness Scale (see Russell, Pepleau, & 
Ferguson, 1978) to assess the extent to which individuals feel a subjective sense of 
   
	  
38
loneliness and social isolation. The three items from the scale we used were (α = .90, .89, 
91, .91): 
1. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I lack companionship.” 
2. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I am no longer close to anyone.” 
3. “After thinking about this event, I feel isolated from important others.” 
 We used the Inclusion of Others in Self Scale (IOSS, see Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 
1992) to assess perceived interpersonal connectedness. Participants were asked to think 
of a relationship and to choose one of seven Venn diagram pictures. In these pictures, two 
circles represent the two individuals in the relationship and range from less to greater 
overlap. In Block 1 of the current study, in a text box, participants were asked to enter the 
initials of the “person that he or she feels closest to.” Those initials, entered in Block 1, 
were linked to the IOSS instructions later in the survey. The wording of the IOSS 
instructions was slightly varied to reflect each of the four events. However, each of the 
four times participants were asked to respond to the IOSS, they were presented with the 
initials of the person that the participant said he or she felt closest to in Block 1. The 
IOSS prompts read as follows: 
1. Actor/Competence Event – “Thinking about the time that you did or said 
something that negatively affected your sense of competence, which of the 
following pictures best illustrates how you feel about (initials from block 1)?” 
2. Actor/Relatedness Event – “Thinking about the time that you did or said 
something that negatively affected a relationship that was important to you, which 
of the following pictures best illustrates how you feel about (initials from block 
1)?” 
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3. Target/Competence – “Thinking about the time that someone close to you did or 
said something that negatively affected your sense of competence, which of the 
following pictures best illustrates how you feel about (initials from block 1)?” 
4. Target/Relatedness – “Thinking about the time that someone close to you did or 
said something that negatively affected a relationship that was important to you, 
which of the following pictures best illustrates how you feel about (initials from 
block 1)?” 
 We measured perceived likeability by adapting a measure from Snyder and 
Swann (1978). Snyder and Swann created 10, 6-point bipolar scales that participants used 
to rate the personal attributes of other individuals (e.g., friendly-unfriendly). Drawing on 
this approach, we asked participants to rate how likeable he or she perceives the self to be 
using a 1 (Very Unlikeable) to 5 (Very Likeable) continuous Likert-type scale.  
 We assessed people’s perceptions of being influence by powerful others with 
three items from the Influence of others Authenticity Scale (Wood, Linly, Maltby, 
Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008).  Items in this scale assess the extent to which people feel the 
authentic self is constrained by the influence of others. The three items from the 
Influence of Others scale were (α = .87, .84, .85, .86): 
1. “After thinking about this event, I realize I usually do what other people tell me to 
do.” 
2. “After thinking about this event, I realize that other people influence me greatly.” 
3. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I am strongly influenced by the 
opinions of others.” 
We used three items from the Avoidance Motivation subscale of the Transgression 
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Related Interpersonal Motivation Scale (see McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough, Root, 
& Cohen, 2006) to assess the extent to which individuals feel motivated to avoid contact 
with someone who has harmed him or her in the past. The three items we chose were (α = 
.91, .89, .91, .91):  
1. “After thinking about this event, I realize I want to avoid those who have harmed 
me.” 
2. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I keep as much distance between 
me and those who have hurt me as I can.” 
3. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I live as if those who have hurt me 
don't exist.” 
As a manipulation check, we used two items, adapted from the Basic Needs General 
questionnaire (see Deci, Ryan, Gagne’, Leone, Usinov, & Kormazheva, 2001), to assess 
the extent to which participants recalled an event consistent with each prompted event 
(i.e., a negative competence foregrounding event for actor/competence and 
target/competence). Participants responded on a 1 (not at all true) to 5 (completely true) 
Likert-type scale to the following items: 
1. “After thinking about this event, I realize I am not always competent.”  
2. “After thinking about this event, I realize that I get along with the people in my 
life (reversed).”  
 We then assessed the degree of difficulty and effort participants reported putting 
forth to imagine the negative events. For each negative event prompted, participants 
responded on a 1(not at all) to 5 (extremely) Likert-type scale to one item assessing the 
extent to which it was difficult for him or her to vividly imagine the event and one item 
   
	  
41
assessing how much effort he or she put forth imagining the event: 
1. “How much difficulty did you have vividly imagining this event again?” 
2. “How much effort would you say you put forth to imagine the experience again?” 
 We gathered other individual differences measures. For example, we collected 
scores on Trait Hostility (Buss & Perry, 1992) to compare participants who were dropped 
from the study to those who were retained. We wanted to confirm that participants kept 
for analyses did not differ from those who were dropped on trait hostility, a construct that 
assesses aggression. The trait hostility subscale has been shown to have desirable 
psychometric properties. For example, the measure is internally consistent and displays 
good test-retest reliability (Buss & Perry, 1992). Trait hostility also displays construct 
(convergent and discriminant) validity. For example, scores on hostility are significantly 
and positively associated with measures of emotionality but significantly negatively 
associated with self-esteem (Buss & Perry, 1992). The 8-item measure used in the current 
study (e.g., “When people are especially nice I wonder what they want.”) displayed good 
internal consistency, α =.84. 
 We also collected scores on Subjective Vitality (see Ryan & Frederick, 1997). 
The Subjective Vitality Scale is a 7-item measure of the extent to which one feels vital 
and energetic in one’s life. We chose the following items from the scale: 
1. “After thinking about this event, I feel alive and vital.” 
2. “After thinking about this event, I don’t feel very energetic.” 
3. “After thinking about this event, I nearly always feel alert and awake.”  
The scale did not display desirable internal consistency across the four events 
(actor/competence, target/competence; actor/relatedness; target/relatedness, respectively, 
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α = .65, .64, .48, .58). As a consequence, subjective vitality was not included in the 
analyses presented later. 
 Participants also rated the extent to which he or she felt angry, guilty, ashamed, 
sad, afraid, and anxious using a 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) Likert-type scale after 





Miscellaneous Analyses: Manipulation Check and Degree 
of Effort and Difficulty Required 
 All general linear model analyses reported in the results section use Pillai’s trace 
unless otherwise stated. As a manipulation check, we tested whether competence and 
relatedness foregrounding events were associated with different patterns of means on the 
single-item competence and relatedness questions from the Basic Needs General 
questionnaire (Deci et al., 2001). Recall that after participants spent 2 minutes thinking 
about each of the four prompted events, they were asked to respond on a 1 (not at all true) 
to 5 (completely true) scale to a question about competence from the Basic Needs 
General questionnaire (“After thinking about this event, I realize that I am not always 
competent.”) and to a question about relatedness from the Basic Needs General 
questionnaire (“After thinking about this event, I realize that I get along with the people 
in my life.”).  
 We expected a crossover interaction such that when individuals recalled a 
competence event, scores would be higher on the basic needs competence item than the 
relatedness item and when individuals recalled a relatedness event, scores would be 
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higher on the basic needs relatedness item than the competence item. We ran a repeated 
measures general linear model with item type (competence item vs. relatedness item), 
role (actor / target), and foregrounded psychological need (competence event vs. 
relatedness event) as within-subject’s variables and scores on the two items from the 
Basic Needs General Questionnaire as dependent variables.  
 Unexpectedly, the multivariate tests revealed a nonsignificant item type by 
foregrounded psychological need interaction, F (1,119) = .27, p = .61. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that after recalling relatedness events, participants had significantly 
higher scores (p < .01) on threats to basic needs relatedness threats (EMM = 3.34) than 
basic needs competence threats (EMM = 2.94). However, recalling competence events 
was associated with significantly higher scores (p < .01) on basic needs relatedness 
threats (EMM = 3.51) than basic needs competence threats (EMM = 3.05).  
 Recall that participants were asked to provide anchoring information about each 
event he or she was asked to recall. One of the anchors was a brief description about what 
the participant did in the event. Prior to analyzing data, the author and a trained research 
assistant examined each participant’s responses to that question for all four event types as 
a second manipulation check. Responses to the anchor often illustrated who the actor / 
target was and the general domain of functioning (competence / relatedness). Thus, we 
used that item to give each participant an “incorrect” (0) or “correct” (1) score on 
nominating an event that fit with the prompted event type. Participants received scores of 
1 when he or she was prompted for an actor event and he or she described an event in 
which he or she was the actor; when prompted for a target event and he or she described 
being a target; when prompted for a competence event and he or she nominated a 
   
	  
44
competence foregrounding event; and when he or she was prompted for a relatedness 
event, he or she nominated a relatedness foregrounding event. The research assistant and 
first author discussed and came to agreement about unclear or difficult to code responses 
to the anchoring item. For cases in which we could not use the brief anchoring 
description, we turned to the narrative for the full details of the event. Only those 
participants who nominated four events that matched all four prompted events were 
included in the final analyses. 
 To further understand differences among events, we conducted a general linear 
model to test whether there were differences in how much effort participants reported the 
events required to vividly imagine and how difficult participants reported the events were 
to vividly imagine. Role (actor/target) and foregrounded psychological need 
(competence/relatedness) were within-subject’s independent variables. Degree of 
difficulty in vividly imagining and degree of effort required were dependent measures. 
There were no main effects of role, F (1,124) = .14, p = .71, or foregrounded 
psychological need F (1,124) = .55, p = .46, and no interaction of role by need on degree 
of difficulty in vividly imagining the event F (1,124) < .01, p = 1.00, nor were there main 
effects of role, F (1,123) = .68, p = .41 or foregrounded psychological need, F (1,123) 
=.34, p = .56, and no interaction of role by foregrounded psychological need on degree of 
effort required to vividly imagine the event, F (1,123) = .46, p = .50. The four events did 
not differ in degree of difficulty in vividly imagining them or in degree of effort required 
to vividly imagine them. 
 To determine the appropriateness of combining some of the threat type scales to 
reduce the number of tests of significance, I ran a principal components factor analysis 
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including all of the adaptive functioning measures with varimax rotation and component 
extraction for eigen values greater than 1. There were 13 components extracted with 
eigen values greater than 1 that appeared to generally correspond with the 13 adaptive 
functioning measures we assessed. Thus, the factor structure from the principle 
components analyses did not support reducing the number of scales by combining them. 
However, because scores on the perceived choice and locus of control scales were highly 
correlated for each event recalled (r’s > .61, p’s < .001), I chose to combine those scales 
(averaged participants’ responses on the two items) into a single item called perceived 
control (a variable title that captures the wording of the six items from the perceived 
choice and locus of control scales). No other scales were so highly or consistently 





 Correlations among the dependent variables were examined by event type for all 
analyses. In general, the dependent variables were weakly to moderately correlated, 
indicating that these data were suitable for testing with one general linear model as 
described below. Recall that higher scores on the dependent measures represent greater 
levels of threat. To test the hypothesized main effects and interactions, we ran a single 
general linear model in which role (actor/target) and foregrounded psychological need 
(competence/relatedness) were within-subjects independent variables. Participants’ 
scores on 12 adaptive functioning measures, self-efficacy, goal re-engagement, self-
alienation, psychological mindedness-interest, psychological mindedness-willingness, 
perceived control (combination of internal locus of control and perceived choice), 
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empathy, loneliness, inclusion of others in self, perceived likeability, influence of others, 
and avoidance motivation, were included as repeated measures dependent variables.  
Multivariate tests of within-subjects effects revealed main effects of role, F (12, 96) = 
7.07, p < .001, partial η2 = .47, foregrounded psychological need, F (12, 96) = 2.63, p < 
.01, partial η2 = .25, and a significant role by need interaction, F (12, 96) = 2.07, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .21.  
 Subsequent to the main analyses above, we ran another GLM with gender and 
order as between-subject factors (with the same within-subjects independent variables 
and adaptive functioning dependent variables). We found no gender differences on mean 
levels of adaptive functioning, F (12, 93) = .96, p = .49, and no effect of order F (12, 93) 
= .78, p = .67. The results presented below were from the GLM analyses that did not 
include gender or order because there were no gender or order effects present.  
 
 
Main Effects of Foregrounded Psychological Needs on 
Adaptive Functioning Measures 
 We followed up the multivariate main effect of foregrounded psychological need 
on adaptive functioning measures with univariate tests. See Table 1 for estimated 
marginal means associated with the significance tests reported below. We anticipated that 
self-efficacy, goal re-engagement, self-alienation, psychological mindedness-interest, 
psychological mindedness-willingness, and perceived control would be more threatened 
by negative competence events than negative relatedness events. Univariate tests did not 
support that anticipated pattern of findings. There was no difference on threats to self-
efficacy, F (1, 107) = 3.23, p = .08, goal re-engagement, F (1, 107) = .18, p = .67, or self-  
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Table 1. Test of Main Effects of Role and Foregrounded Psychological Need on 
Measures of Adaptive Functioning in Study 1 (Higher Values Represent Greater Threats). 
 
Dependent Measures Role Psychological Need 
      Actor   Target Competence Relatedness 
Gen. Self-eff. 2.82 (.10)** 2.57 (.10)** 2.64 (.10) 2.75 (.10) 
Goal Re-engage. 2.43 (.10) 2.40 (.09) 2.40 (.10) 2.43 (.10) 
Self-alienation 1.29 (.03)** 1.23 (.03)** 1.24 (.02) 1.28 (.03) 
Psych. Minded Int. 3.23 (.10)** 2.61 (.10)** 2.77 (.10)** 3.07 (.10)** 
Psych. Minded Will. 2.51 (.11) 2.43 (.10) 2.38 (.10)* 2.56 (.11)* 
Perceived Con. 2.66 (.08) 2.73 (.08) 2.72 (.08) 2.67 (.09) 
Empathy 2.74 (.10)** 3.01 (.10)** 2.92 (.10) 2.82 (.10) 
Loneliness 1.32 (.03) 1.30 (.03) 1.27 (.03)** 1.35 (.03)** 
IOSS 3.91 (.18) 3.85 (.18) 3.92 (.19) 3.84 (.17) 
Perceived Like. 2.78 (.09)** 2.42 (.08)** 2.46 (.09)** 2.73 (.08)** 
Influence of Others 1.48 (.03) 1.52 (.03) 1.51 (.03) 1.49 (.03) 
Avoidance Motiv. 2.63 (.11) 2.71 (.11) 2.62 (.11) 2.72 (.11) 
Note: Gen. Self-eff. = Generalized Self-efficacy; Psych. Minded Int. = Psychological 
Mindedness Interest; Psych. Minded Will. = Psychological Mindedness Willingness; 
Perceived Con. = Perceived Control; IOSS = Inclusion of Others in Self; Perceived Like. 
= Perceived Likeability of self; Avoidance Motiv. = Avoidance Motivation; Estimated 
marginal means are presented above, ** indicates difference on adaptive functioning 
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alienation, F (1, 107) = 3.26, p = .07, for competence and relatedness events.  
 Univariate tests revealed a significant difference on psychological mindedness-
interest and psychological mindedness-willingness but in the opposite direction of our 
predictions. Participants reported greater threats to psychological mindedness-interest, F 
(1, 107) = 7.71, p < .01, partial η2 =.07, and psychological mindedness-willingness, F (1, 
107) = 4.26, p < .05, partial η2 =.04, in relatedness events compared to competence 
events. 
 We anticipated that empathy, loneliness, inclusion of others in self, perceived 
likeability, influence of others, and avoidance motivation would be more threatened by 
negative relatedness events than negative competence events. Univariate tests revealed 
that there was no difference on threats to empathy, F (1, 107) = 2.11, p = .16, for 
relatedness and competence events, that loneliness was worse in relatedness compared to 
competence events, F (1, 107) = 11.62, p < .001, partial η2 =.10 (see Table 1), there was  
no difference on inclusion of others in self in relatedness events compared to competence 
events, F (1, 107) = .28, p = .60, and participants perceived themselves as less likeable 
after relatedness compared to competence events, F (1, 107) = 16.43, p < .001, partial η2 
=.13 (see Table 1). There was no difference on being influenced by others, F (1, 107) = 
.94, p = .34, or avoidance motivation for relatedness and competence events, F (1, 107) = 
1.46, p = .23. These findings indicate that where there is an effect of foregrounded need 
on adaptive functioning measures; it is more typical for relatedness events to be 
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Main Effects of Role (Actor/Target) on Adaptive Functioning Measures 
 
 We followed up the multivariate main-effect of role by examining univariate tests. 
See Table 1 for estimated marginal means associated with the tests of significance 
reported below. We anticipated that self-efficacy, goal re-engagement, self-alienation, 
psychological mindedness-interest, psychological mindedness-willingness, and perceived 
likeability would be more threatened in actor events than target events.  
 Univariate tests revealed higher levels of threats to self-efficacy in actor 
compared to target events, F (1, 107) = 11.06, p < .01, partial η2 =.09, higher levels of 
threats to self-alienation in actor compared to target events, F (1, 107) = 9.43, p < .01, 
partial η2 =.08, higher levels of threats to psychological mindedness-interest in actor 
compared to target events, F (1, 107) = 21.76, p < .01, partial η2 =.17, higher levels of 
threats to perceived likeability in actor compared to target events, F (1, 107) = 28.21, p < 
.01, partial η2 =.21, no difference on threats to goal re-engagement in actor and target 
events, F (1, 107) = .12, p = .73, and no difference on threats to psychological 
mindedness-willingness in actor or target events, F (1, 107) = 1.04, p =.31 (see Table 1). 
 We anticipated higher levels of threats to perceived control, empathy, loneliness, 
influence of others, and avoidance motivation in target compared to actor events. 
Univariate tests revealed that there was no difference on threats to perceived control in 
target and actor events, F (1, 107) = 2.47, p = .12, that threats to empathy were 
stronger in target than in actor events, F (1, 107) = 9.10, p < .01, partial η2 = .08, there 
was no difference in loneliness in target and actor events, F (1, 107) = .47, p = .50, no 
difference on influence from others in target and actor events, F (1, 107) = 2.54, p = .11, 
and no difference on avoidance motivation in target and actor events F (1, 107) = 1.26, p 
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= .27. Taken together, these findings indicate that where there is an effect of role on 
adaptive functioning measures, it is more typical for actor events to be associated with 
higher levels of threat than target events. 
 
 
Interactions of Foregrounded Psychological Needs and Role 
on Threats to Adaptive Functioning 
 We expected that recalling an actor/competence event would be associated with 
higher levels of threats to self-efficacy than target/competence, actor/relatedness, or 
target/relatedness. We expected that target/relatedness events would be associated with 
the highest levels of loneliness compared to the other three types of events.  
 Univariate tests revealed that there was no role by foregrounded psychological 
need interaction for threats to self-efficacy F (1, 107) = 2.50, p = .12, or loneliness F (1, 
107) = 1.54, p = .22. Univariate tests revealed a significant role by foregrounded 
psychological need interaction on perceived control, F (1, 107) = 11.91, p < .01, partial 
η2 = .10. Pairwise comparisons showed that perceived control was more threatened by 
actor/competence events (EMM = 2.78) than actor/relatedness events (EMM = 2.54, p < 
.01) and perceived control was more threatened in target/relatedness events (EMM = 
2.80) than actor/relatedness events (EMM = 2.54, p < .01). People’s sense of having 
control over events in the competence domain is more threatened when one is the actor 
than the target. This pattern reverses in the relatedness domain where sense of control is 
more threatened when one is the target compared to when one is the actor.   
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Main Effects of Well-being and Emotional Stability on the Relations Between 
Threatening Events and Measures of Adaptive Functioning 
 We expected that individuals high in well-being and emotional stability would 
report diminished threats to adaptive functioning for all four events. We ran a general 
linear model with role (actor/target) and foregrounded psychological need 
(competence/relatedness) as within-subjects independent variables and participants’ 
scores on the same 12 adaptive functioning measures above were included as repeated 
measures dependent variables. We also included measures of psychological well-being 
and emotional stability (neuroticism from the Big 5 personality inventory) as continuous 
independent variables.  
 Analyses revealed main effects of psychological well-being, F (12, 94) = 8.28, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .51, and emotional stability, F (12, 94) = 2.32, p = .01, partial η2 = .23 
on levels of threat. There were no longer significant main effects of role, F (12, 94) = 
1.28, p > .05, or foregrounded psychological need, F (12, 94) = 1.03, p > .05, on levels of 
threat. There was no longer a significant role by foregrounded psychological need 
interaction, F (12, 94) = .83, p > .05. The interactions of well-being by role F (12, 94) = 
1.53, p > .05, and well-being by foregrounded need F (12, 94) = .93, p > .05, were not 
significant nor were the interactions of emotional stability by role, F (12, 94) = .99, p > 
.05, or emotional stability by foregrounded need, F (12, 94) = 1.42, p > .05. The three-
way interactions (well-being by role by foregrounded need and emotional stability by role 
by foregrounded need) were also not significant, F (12, 94) = 1.12, p > .05, F (12, 94) = 
.95, p > .05, respectively. However, univariate analyses revealed a significant 
psychological well-being by role interaction on threats to self efficacy, F (1, 105) = 4.48, 
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p < .05, partial η2 = .04. We first followed this finding up with correlational analyses. The 
relationship between psychological well-being and threats to self-efficacy was stronger in 
target (r = -.60, p < .01) than actor events (r = -.49, p < .01).  
 Univariate analyses also revealed a significant psychological well-being by 
foregrounded need interaction on inclusion of others in self, F (1, 105) = 4.54, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .04. Correlational analyses showed that the relationship between 
psychological well-being and threats to inclusion of others in self was stronger in 
relatedness events (r = -.16, p = .07) than competence events (r = -.06, p = .51), though 
neither of these findings were statistically significant so we do not mention them further. 
Finally, univariate tests revealed a significant emotional stability by foregrounded 
psychological need interaction on psychological mindedness-willingness, F (1, 105) = 
4.53, p < .05, partial η2 = .04. The relationship between emotional stability and threats to 
psychological mindedness-willingness was stronger in relatedness events (r = -.35, p < 
.01) than in competence events (r = -.18, p <.05). These findings suggest that individual 
differences in well-being and emotional stability may lead people to feel different degrees 
of threat from different types of negative events. Notably, in terms of average levels of 
threat, well-being and emotional stability were negatively associated with magnitudes of 
threat regardless of event type.  
 Consistent with the effect sizes reported from the GLM, those relationships were 
stronger for well-being than for emotional stability. In sum, these results suggest that  
after adjusting for person characteristics (individual differences in well-being and 
emotional stability), event characteristics (role and the foregrounded psychological need) 
are largely not associated with specific types of adaptive functioning threats. 
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 Next we expanded on the correlations reported above. Relying only on 
correlations is limited because they cannot tell us whether event-based variability in types 
of threats differ for those who scored high on well-being and emotional stability 
compared to those who score low on well-being and emotional stability. 
 
 
Exploratory Analyses: Further Examination of The Relationships 
Between Individual Differences and Threat Types 
 We calculated median splits for well-being and emotional stability to categorize 
participants as high and low scorers on those measures. We computed each person’s 
average score for each adaptive functioning threat (e.g., mean self-alienation level) across 
event types (actor/competence, target/competence, actor/relatedness, and 
target/relatedness, see Table 2). We also computed variability for each participant for 
each adaptive functioning measure (e.g., variance self-alienation) across event types. We 
did this so that we could assess the extent to which standings on individual differences 
predicted consistency vs. variability in particular forms of adaptive functioning threats.  
 We tested whether participants who scored high vs. low on well-being and high 
vs. low on emotional stability differed in variability for each adaptive functioning threat 
(e.g., variance self-alienation) across event types. We ran a general linear model with 
variability on the adaptive functioning measures as dependent variables and dichotomized 
well-being and emotional stability as between subject’s independent variables. 
 Multivariate tests revealed that there were no significant main effects of well-
being, F (11, 111) = 1.05, p = .41, or emotional stability, F (11, 111) = 1.08, p = .39, and  
no well-being by emotional stability interactions, F (11, 111) = 1.09, p = .37, on  
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Table 2. Average Levels of Threat Across Events and Their Correlations With Well-
being and Emotional Stability Study 1. 
 
Dependent Measures Avg. Score 
(SD) 
Well-being Emo. Stability Avg. Var. 
(SD) 
Gen. Self-eff. 2.68 (.94) -.58** -.29** .48 (.61) 
Goal Re-engage. 2.45 (.92) -.60** -.22* .53 (.68) 
Self-alienation 1.67 (.67) -.48** -.22* .39 (.60) 
Psych. Minded Int. 2.96 (.82) -.13 -.10 1.51 (1.28) 
Psych. Minded Will. 2.50 (.97) -.39** -.29** .71 (.77) 
Perceived Con. 2.71 (.80) -.60** -.24** .34 (.41) 
Empathy 2.85 (.94) -.39** -.25** .67 (.82) 
Loneliness 1.81 (.85) -.52** -.20* .47 (.78) 
IOSS 3.81 (1.72) -.12 .02 2.50 (2.73) 
Perceived Like. 2.58 (.78) -.53** -.26** .52 (.56) 
Influence of Others 2.35 (.80) -.28** -.26** .49 (.66) 
Avoidance Motiv. 2.69 (1.05) -.18* -.32** .67 (.87) 
Note: Gen. Self-eff. = Generalized Self-efficacy; Psych. Minded Int. = Psychological 
Mindedness Interest; Psych. Minded Will. = Psychological Mindedness Willingness; 
Perceived Con. = Perceived Control; IOSS = Inclusion of Others in Self; Perceived Like. 
= Perceived Likeability of self; Avoidance Motiv. = Avoidance Motivation; Estimated 
marginal means are presented above; Emo. Stability = Emotional Stability; Avg. Var. = 
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variability scores. Tests of between-subject’s effects revealed that participants who 
scored high on well-being had higher variability in self-efficacy threat levels across 
events (EMM = .57) compared to those who scored low on well-being (EMM = .33), F (1, 
121) = 4.07, p < .05, partial η2 = .03. Between-subject’s effects also revealed a significant 
well-being by emotional stability interaction on variability in self-alienation threat levels 
across events, F (1, 121) = 4.01, p < .05, partial η2 = .03. Pairwise comparisons indicated 
that individuals low in well-being and low on emotional stability had greater variability 
in self-alienation threat levels reported across events (EMM = .50) than those high in 
well-being and low on emotional stability (EMM = .18, p = .03).      
 Our exploratory analyses suggest that individual differences in well-being and 
emotional stability, and combinations of individual differences may be linked to people 
perceiving different patterns of adaptive functioning threats across events. We note that 
well-being and emotional stability were highly correlated in the current study, r = .57, p < 
.01. Yet not everyone who scores high on well-being scores high on emotional stability, 
and different combinations of those individual differences appear to matter for the degree 




 As a first step toward moving away from a one-size-fits-all approach to events 
and meaning-making, we elicited memories of four negative events that differed on the 
role (actor/target) people played in the event and the psychological need the events 
foregrounded (competence/relatedness). We tested the implications of those different 
event characteristics (actor/competence, target/competence, actor/relatedness, 
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target/relatedness) on a battery of adaptive functioning measures and the extent to which 
person characteristics mattered for relationships between event characteristics and threat 
levels.  
 In terms of event characteristics, we found that the actor and relatedness events 
were associated with a wider range of adaptive functioning threats and stronger levels of 
threats than target and competence events. However, relationships between types of 
events and types of threats were no longer significant when accounting for person 
characteristics (well-being and emotional stability). These findings are discussed below.  
 
 
Event Characteristics – Foregrounded Psychological Needs 
 Relatedness events were associated with a broader range of threats to adaptive 
functioning than competence events. Compared to competence events, relatedness events 
were associated with greater feelings of loneliness, diminished perceived self-likeability, 
diminished interest in understanding the meaning and motivation behind one’s actions 
(interest in psychological mindedness), as well as with diminished willingness to delve 
into the feelings and psychological characteristics that the negative event generated 
(willingness to engage in psychological mindedness).  
 Unexpectedly, there was no difference for feeling efficacious after participants 
recalled competence events compared to when they recalled negative relatedness events. 
One reason for this null finding may be that the college-aged participants comprising the 
Study 1 sample may be at a time in their lives that equally prioritizes vocational identity 
considerations and intimacy concerns (Arnett, 2000). Consequently, feelings of efficacy 
(and inefficacy) may arise equally in those domains when things go wrong. It may also be 
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the case that we did not include measures that adequately distinguished adaptive 
functioning in the competence domain from the relatedness domain. We address this 
limitation in Study 2 by adding three adaptive functioning items that assess competence 
in the vocational domain (e.g., perceived intelligence). 
 
 
Event Characteristics – Role 
 The overall pattern of results indicated that when there was an effect of role on 
adaptive functioning measures, it was more typical for actor events to be associated with 
higher levels of threats than target events. Actor events were associated with higher levels 
of threats to self-efficacy, self-alienation, psychological mindedness-interest, and 
perceived likeability than target events. Target events were only associated with higher 
levels of threat than actor events for one of our adaptive functioning measures, empathy 
for others. This finding is in line with past research, which finds that victims of harm tend 
to focus on their own subjective experiences as opposed to the intentions, motivations, or 
emotions of the perpetrator (Wainryb et al., 2005). In sum, these findings hold that the 
negative events in which we see ourselves as the “actor” may be associated with higher 
levels of threats for more forms of adaptive functioning than target events.   
 
 
Role by Foregrounded Need Interactions 
 
 Target/relatedness events were associated with higher levels of threat to perceived 
control than actor/relatedness events were. However, actor/competence events were 
associated with greater threats to perceived control than actor/relatedness events. Recall 
that the perceived control measure is meant to assess the extent to which people feel that 
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their own characteristics, actions, and choices contribute to their being able to reach 
desired outcomes.  
 The first part of this interaction (target/relatedness > actor/relatedness) fits 
conceptually with the difference between losing control through being targeted vs. 
exercising control through action. The second part of the interaction (actor/competence > 
actor/relatedness) may be linked to negative actor/competence events having more 
intrapersonal characteristics and actor/relatedness events having more interpersonal 
characteristics. That is, although people exert control and make choices in the relational 
domain, when doing so, we may maintain some sense that other people’s goals in the 
relational domain may not align with our own. The complex mix of one’s own and other 
peoples’ goals may lead one to feel that actor/relatedness events are less “controllable” in 
general. In contrast, actor/competence events may be largely about achievement and may 
center around activities of vocational and academic strivings in which success or failure 
may be perceived as more a function of one’s own individual, intrapersonal 
characteristics (like knowledge and skill). The young adults in our sample may perceive 
being able to exert more control over actor/competence events than control over 
relational-oriented (actor/relatedness) events. 
 
Individual Differences 
 Perhaps the most important finding in Study 1 was that when we accounted for 
individual differences in well-being and emotional stability, the relationships between 
types of events and types of threats were no longer statistically significant. Indeed, we 
found strong main effects of well-being and emotional stability on types of threats. This 
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finding supports the idea that the degree of threat to adaptive functioning that people 
experience is more tied to characteristics of individuals than to characteristics of events. 
In particular, and consistent with past findings suggesting that psychological well-being 
and emotional stability may linked to other beneficial characteristics (e.g., Lilgendahl et 
al., 2013; Mansfield et al., 2015; Ryff, Keyes, & Hughes, 2003), Study 1 results indicated 
that higher well-being and emotional stability was associated with lower average levels of 
threat to adaptive functioning regardless of event type (see Table 2). 
 Participants who scored high on well-being reported greater variability in the 
degree of threat they perceived to self-efficacy across events compared to participants 
who scored low on well-being (see Table 3). High variability could indicate a 
compartmentalization of threat level such that one event type is more linked to threats to 
self-efficacy (high threat to self-efficacy scores) than other events (low threat to self-
efficacy scores). If this is true, people who score high on well-being appear to exhibit 
greater “compartmentalization of threats to self-efficacy” whereas those who score low  
on well-being exhibit greater diffusion of threats to self-efficacy across events. However, 
we also showed that people who scored high on well-being and low on emotional 
stability reported greater variability in threats to self-alienation across events compared to 
those who scored low on well-being and low on emotional stability. Thus, to the extent 
that the compartmentalization and diffusion of threats by events is accurate, 
compartmentalization and diffusion may depend on specific combinations of individual 
differences and not just levels on a single individual difference. 
 Perhaps the most straightforward implication of the finding that variability in 
levels of some forms of threats (self-efficacy and self-alienation) is tied to individual 
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Table 3. Average Variability in Levels of Threat Study 1 and Study 2. 
 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 Avg. Variability  (SD) Avg. Variability  (SD) 
Gen. Self-eff. .48 (.61) .71 (.79) 
Goal Re-engage. .53 (.68) .65 (.83) 
Self-alienation .39 (.60) .52 (.88) 
Psych. Minded. Int. 1.51 (1.28) 1.51 (1.29) 
Psych. Minded. Will. .71 (.77) .77 (.91) 
Self-Worth Not Collected .07 (.08) 
Perceived Con. .34 (.41) .67 (.81) 
Empathy .67 (.82) .67 (.81) 
Loneliness .47 (.78) .38 (.65) 
IOSS 2.50 (2.73) 5.04 (3.17) 
Perceived Like. .52 (.56) .63 (.74) 
Influence of Others .49 (.66) .38 (.54) 
Avoidance Motiv. .67 (.87) 1.06 (1.24) 
Note: Note: Gen. Self-eff. = Generalized Self-efficacy; Goal Re-engage. = Goal Re-
engagement; Psych. Minded Int. = Psychological Mindedness Interest; Psych. Minded 
Will. = Psychological Mindedness Willingness; Perceived Con. = Perceived Control; 
IOSS = Inclusion of Others in Self; Perceived Like. = Perceived Likeability of self; 
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differences, is that person features, not just event features, matter for perception of 
threats. In sum, although types of events may be linked to types of threats, individual 
differences in well-being and emotional stability had stronger relationships with level of 
threat. An important limitation of Study 1 is that we can only generalize our findings to 
other young adult college students. Thus, we sought a more generalizable community 
sample for Study 2 comprised of people across the adult age range.  
 Past research on challenging events indicate that older adults are less likely than 
younger adults to view negative, self-discrepant experiences as a challenge to self (Rice 
& Pasupathi, 2010). Work on emotion and aging indicates that as people age through 
adulthood, negative emotional experiences become less enduring whereas positive 
emotional experiences endure longer (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 
2000). Other work finds small but significant increases in some aspects of well-being 
with age (autonomy, self-acceptance, positive relations with others, environmental 
mastery), and small but significant decreases in other aspects of well-being with age 
 (purpose in life, personal growth; Ryff et al., 2003). Furthermore, people seem to change 
expectations for the self such that actual and ideal selves are more aligned across 
adulthood (Ryff, 1991), which may help “smooth out” the shocks of negative self-
relevant events.  
 In addition, increasing experience in dealing with life stressors may promote 
overall competence and resolve as we age. From the framework of the Competence-
environmental Press Model (Lawton & Nahemow, 1973), increased experience with 
stressors may limit the degree to which older adults perceive new negative events as 
threatening. Similarly, Socioemotional Selectivity theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & 
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Charles, 1999) argues that changes in our social-emotional priorities as we age may help 
older adults become resilient in the face of stress.  
 Socioemotional selectivity theory argues that as we near the end of our lives, we 
come to the realization that we have less time in front of us than we had when we were 
younger. As the “time horizons” shorten, they usher in a change in our social motives. 
Instead of prioritizing acquisition of new knowledge and new skills, as young adults with 
long time horizons do, older adults begin to prioritize emotion-regulation and better 
functioning relationships with important social partners. As a consequence, older adults 
may become better at disregarding events that are not central to their most important 
social relationships. These works suggest that changes associated with aging may be 
especially relevant for how people process threats from different types of negative events. 
In Study 2, we collected data from people ranging in age from 20 to 69. Sixty-nine was 
our cutoff because we wanted to limit issues of individual differences in cognitive decline 
that are more likely to be associated with aging in the 70s and beyond.  
 We also added three single-item self-perception dependent measures (perceptions 
of intelligence, self-worth, and effectiveness at work) that we anticipated might better 
distinguish negative competence and relatedness events. We also adjusted the prompt for 
target competence events in Study 2. The Study 1 target competence prompt 
inadvertently confounded competence with relatedness needs (“Now I want you to think 
of a time when someone close to you did or said something that negatively affected your 
sense of competence.”). In Study 2, we adjusted that prompt to say: “Now I want you to  
think of a time when someone else did or said something that negatively affected your 


















 We had the following goals for Study 2. First, we wanted to test age differences 
on perceived threats in our four different types of negative events. Second, we wanted to 
determine whether main effects of foregrounded psychological need would remain 
primarily attributable to relatedness being foregrounded as opposed to competence. 
Third, we wanted to determine whether main effects of role on threats would remain 
primarily attributable to being the actor as opposed to target. Fourth, we wanted to 
determine whether main effects and interaction effects of foregrounded need and role 
disappeared when we included individual differences in well-being and emotional 
stability using a more generalizable sample of community participants.  
 Study 2 used a more representative sample of adults as opposed to college 
students. College students may be a specialized population for whom the association 
between degree of threat and type of event may differ compared to older adult 
community participants. Thus, we went back to our initial reasoning that negative events 
that foreground competence and relatedness events and those in which one is the actor vs. 
target may create particular kinds of adaptive functioning threats. We again tested our 
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original hypotheses from Study 1 with small changes as described below. 
 
Main Effects of Age 
 We anticipated that age would be broadly associated with decreased levels of 
threat across the different event types.  
 
 
Main Effects of Foregrounded Psychological Needs (Competence/Relatedness) 
on Threats to Adaptive Functioning 
 Drawing on the agency-oriented dependent measures, we anticipated that there 
would be more challenges to self-efficacy, goal re-engagement, self-alienation, 
psychological mindedness-interest, psychological mindedness-willingness, having an 
internal locus of control, and perceived choice in negative competence events than 
negative relatedness events. New to Study 2, we also anticipated that perceptions of 
intelligence, being effective at work, and having high self-worth would be more 
threatened in competence than relatedness events because those aspects of self-evaluation 
may be strongly linked to achieving in the vocational domain. 
 We anticipated that there would be greater threats to empathy for others, greater 
sense of loneliness, greater threats to inclusion of others in self, perceived self-likeability, 
influence of others on self, and avoidance motivation in negative relatedness events than 
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Main Effects of Role (Actor/Target) on Threats to Adaptive Functioning 
 We anticipated that there would be higher levels of threats to self-efficacy, goal 
re-engagement, self-alienation, psychological mindedness-interest, psychological 
mindedness-willingness, perceived likeability, and perceptions of intelligence, 
effectiveness at work, and having high self-worth in negative actor events than in 
negative target events.  
 We anticipated that there would be higher levels of threats to perceived choice, 
locus of control, empathy for others, greater loneliness, greater influence of others on 
self, and avoidance motivation in negative target events than in negative actor events.  
 
Interactions of Foregrounded Psychological Need (Competence/Relatedness) 
and Role (Actor/Target) on Adaptive Functioning 
 We anticipated that actor/competence events would be associated with higher 
levels of threats to self-efficacy and to perceptions of intelligence, being effective at 
work, and having high self-worth than the other three events. Again, we expected this 
because of the potentially agentic, goal-oriented nature of competence events and the fact 
that being in the actor role may be associated with people being likely to perceive the self 
as a “failure.” We anticipated that target/relatedness events would be associated with 
higher loneliness than the other events. Based on Study 1 findings, we also anticipated 
that we would replicate the crossover interaction, such that perceived control was more 
threatened in actor/competence than target/competence, but perceived control was more 
threatened in target/ relatedness than actor/relatedness events. Conceptually, this finding 
makes sense per the Study 1 Discussion. 
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Main Effects of High Well-being and Emotional Stability on the Relations 
Between Threatening Events and Measures of Adaptive Functioning 
 Consistent with Study 1, we expected that being high in well-being and emotional 
stability would again be associated with lower threats to adaptive functioning after 







 Community participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
platform (n = 224). Six participants were dropped from the sample for not completing 
large portions of the data (see Appendix A for full information about sample and data 
preparation). As in Study 1, we examined the remaining 218 participants’ responses to 
the three memory anchors for each event in order to determine whether each participant 
nominated an event that matched the prompt. For example, when prompted for 
actor/competence, we examined the anchor items to assess whether the participant caused 
the negative event and whether the negative event would have foregrounded the 
psychological need for competence. Following recommended best practices when 
collecting data from Mechanical Turk workers (Grysman, in press), we also included in 
the survey an attention check item in three places that prompted participants as follows: 
“This is an attention check item. Please click ‘Strongly Agree’ to demonstrate that you 
have read this question.” Only those participants who nominated events that matched the 
prompted event and who correctly responded to all three attention check items were 
included in the final analyses.   
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 Of the 218 participants, 141 met both of the above standards. Loss of participants 
by age-group went as follows: for the 20-29 year old age group, 14 of 45 participants 
(31%) were dropped; for the 30-39 year old age group, 12 of 40 (30%) were dropped; for 
the 40-49 year old age group, 14 of 40 (35%) were dropped; for the 50-59 year old age 
group, 23 of 57 (40.4%) were dropped; and for the 60-69 year old age group, 20 of 42 
(47.6%) were dropped. The 141 participants in the final sample scored significantly 
higher on trait conscientiousness (M = 4.07, SD = .67) than those who were dropped from 
the sample (M = 3.85, SD = .77), t(222) = 2.23, p = .03. Kept participants did not differ 
on neuroticism t(222) = -.72, p = .47, openness to experience t(222) = .19, p = .85, 
extraversion t(222) = -1.24, p = .22, agreeableness t(222) = .50, p = .62, trait hostility 
t(222) = .09, p = .93, or psychological well-being t(222) = 1.31, p = .19 from those who 
were dropped.  
 The final sample included 31 individuals in the 20-29 year age group, 28 in the 
30-39 year age group, 26 in the 40-49 year age group, 34 in the 50-59 year age group, 
and 22 in the 60-69 year age group. The final sample (female = 75) had an average age of 
43.32 (SD = 13.82, range 20-69) and 7.1% of those participants reported being African 
American, 3.5% Asian American, 80.9% European American, 6.4% Latino American, 
1.4% reported being Native American, 0.7% chose not to disclose, and 2.1% chose Other 
as their ethnicity.  
 Again, we were concerned with what reducing sample size cost us in terms of our 
power to detect statistically significant effects. We did the same analyses as in Study 1 to 
determine our achieved power given our reduction in sample size to 141 participants. 
Post-hoc analyses for repeated measures MANOVA using G*power 3.0 (Erdfelder, Faul, 
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& Buchner, 1996), given an alpha of .05, and our sample size of 141 (again estimating 
effects using the F test family) indicated that when testing within-subjects effects on our 
dependent variables, we had power of .99 to detect a Cohen’s f2 effect size of =.02, which 
is a small effect size according to Cohen (1988). We found that we had substantially 
more power to detect between-subjects effects in Study 2. Our power to detect the same 
small effect (Cohen’s f2 = .02) when testing between group factors with 2 levels was 




 Study 2 used the same procedure as Study 1. The survey was identical other than 
our changing the target-competence prompt, the addition of self-compassion as an 
individual difference measure in the initial section of the survey, three single-item 
dependent measures aimed at disentangling competence and relatedness events 
(described in Measures), the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (which was completed 
with other individual differences questionnaires at the beginning of the study), and a 
Meaning-making questionnaire (which was completed at the very end of the survey after 
participants had written about their final negative event). Measures added in Study 2 are 
described in the Measures section.  
 Participants first read a brief description of the study on MTurk. Participants were 
notified that they would be paid 3 dollars per hour for 2 hours of anticipated work for a 
total of 6 dollars. Those interested in participating then clicked a link to the Qualtrics 
survey. There, participants read the same consent form as used in Study 1. Participants 
provided consent by clicking “next” as in Study 1. The survey was opened on MTurk to 
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people in the age categories 20-29, 30-30, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69.  
 To ensure that participants were in the correct age group, they were asked to enter 
their age after completing consent. If their age was not in the specified range for the 
posted age group (that is, if someone entered ‘22’ in the 30-year-olds’ survey), they were 
directed to an end page and not paid. After the debriefing page at the end of the survey, 
participants were given a validation code that they emailed back to the researcher. We 





 Below, we list reliability coefficients for all variables but only describe new 
measures added in Study 2. For Psychological Well-being (Ryff, 1989), subscale 
reliabilities were as follows: self-acceptance, α = .92; personal growth, α = .88; purpose 
in life, α = .86; positive relations with others, α = .88; autonomy, α = .85; environmental 
mastery, α = .88; and at the overall level, α = .96. For the Big Five Inventory (John & 
Srivastava, 1999), subscale reliabilities were as follows: extraversion, α =.90; 
agreeableness, α =.83; conscientiousness, α = .86; neuroticism, α =.89, openness to 
experience α =.87. 
 Participants again completed Likert-type self-report questionnaire ratings 
assessing a variety of distinct forms of adaptive functioning. Each scale listed was again 
limited to the same three items used in Study 1. Once more, higher scores represented 
higher magnitude of threat to adaptive functioning. Alpha values presented below are for 
participants’ responses to each scale after thinking about the actor/competence; 
target/competence; actor/relatedness; and target/relatedness events, respectively. 
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Reliabilities are not computed for single-item measures.  
 The Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) items 
displayed good reliability (α = .84, .93, .92, .93). The Goal Re-engagement Scale 
(Wrosch et al., 2003) items displayed excellent reliability (α = .94, .95, .95, .93). The Self 
Alienation-Authenticity Scale (Wood et al., 2008) items displayed good reliability (α = 
.89, .89, .92, .90). We used the same single-item measures of Psychological Mindedness-
Interest and Willingness (Conte et al., 1996). The Perceived Choice (Sheldon & Deci, 
1996) items displayed good reliability (α = .83, .88, .84, .88). The Multidimensional 
Locus of Control – Internal subscale (Levenson, 1981) items displayed good reliability (α 
= .87, .91, .85, .86). 
 In Study 2, we added items from the Self-perception Profile for Adults (Messer & 
Harter, 2012) scale. The three items we added were from independent subscales of the 
self-perception profile for adults. Participants responded on a scale of 1 (not at all true) to 
5 (completely true).  
One item was adapted from the perceptions of intelligence scale:  
1. After thinking about this event, I question my intelligence. 
One item was adapted from the job competence scale: 
2. After thinking about this event, I worry whether I can do my work 
effectively or not. 
One item was adapted from the perceptions of global self-worth scale:  
3. After thinking about this event, I question whether I am a worthwhile 
person or not. 
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 The three items from the Perspective Taking subscale of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) displayed excellent reliability (α = .89, .93, 91, .92). The 
three items from the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell et al., 1978) displayed excellent 
reliability (α = .93, .93, 92, .93). We once again used the single item from Study 1 to 
assess Inclusion of Others in Self Scale (Aron et al., 1992). We used our single-item 
measure of Perceived Likeability (adapted from Snyder & Swann, 1978) to have 
participants rate how likeable he or she perceived the self to be after thinking of each 
negative event. The three items from the Influence from Others scale (Wood et al., 2008) 
once again displayed good reliability (α = .88, .90, .87, .88). Finally, the three items from 
the Avoidance Motivation subscale of the Transgression Related Interpersonal 
Motivation Scale (see McCullough, et al., 1998; McCullough et al., 2006) displayed 
excellent reliability (α = .93, .93, .94, .92). 
 We used the same two items, adapted from the Basic Needs General questionnaire 
(see Deci et al., 2001) as a manipulation check to test the extent to which recalling a 
competence event was associated with challenges to competence and recalling a 
relatedness event was associated with challenges to relatedness. Participants responded 
on a 1 (not at all true) to 5 (completely true) Likert-type scale. 
 For each negative event imagined, participants also responded to an item 
assessing the extent to which it was difficult for him or her to vividly imagine the event 
and an item assessing how much effort he or she put forth imagining the event using a 1 
(not at all) to 5 (extremely) Likert-type scale. As in Study 1, we again used Trait Hostility 
(Buss & Perry, 1992) to compare included and excluded participants, α = .87. 
Again, the Subjective Vitality scale (Ryan & Frederick, 1997) failed to demonstrate 
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desirable internal consistency across the four events (actor/competence, 
target/competence; actor/relatedness; target/relatedness, respectively, α = .62, α =.58, α 
=.55, α =.61). As a consequence, subjective vitality was not included as a dependent 
variable. Participants also rated the extent to which he or she felt angry, guilty, ashamed, 
sad, afraid, and anxious using a 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) Likert-type scale after 
imagining each negative event. These measures were not used in the current study. 
 In Study 2, we added the Self-Compassion Scale (Neff, 2003). The self-
compassion scale is made up of three subscales: self-kindness, mindfulness, and 
common-humanity (see also Raes et al., 2011). Past work has demonstrated that each 
subscale has good internal consistency (α’s ranging from .77 to .81) and reliability for all 
26 items is also high at .92. The scale demonstrates good test-retest validity with subscale 
scores correlated in the .80 to .93 range over a 3-week period. We used a 12-item “short” 
version of the scale for the current study. Self-kindness was assessed with four items 
(e.g., I try to be understanding and patient towards those aspects of my personality I don’t 
like), α = .77, mindfulness was assessed with four items (e.g., When something upsets me 
I try to keep my emotions in balance.), α = .77. Common-humanity was assessed with 
four items (e.g., I try to see my failings as part of the human condition.), α = .67. We 
summed the items in the current study and overall (as used in the current study), the scale 
showed good reliability, α =.89. 
 We also added the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ; Spence, Helmreich, 
& Stapp, 1975) to Study 2. The full 24-item PAQ assesses characteristics commonly 
associated with masculinity (8 items), femininity (8 items), and androgyny (8 items). We 
collected data on the 16 masculine and feminine items. Participants saw the following 




“The next 16 items inquire about what kind of person you think you are. 
For each attribute on the left, please choose the response (click the radio 
bubble) that best describes HOW CHARACTERISTIC OF YOU the 
attribute is. For example, if you think that you are not at all artistic you 
would choose, ‘Not at all like me’. If you think that you are pretty artistic, 
you might choose, ‘Like me’ (the 4th option), and so forth.”  
Participants responded on a 1 (not at all like me) to 5 (just like me) scale to each item. 
 Finally, after participants wrote narratives of their four negative events, they were 
prompted to again recall the “last” event he or she had written about. With that event in 
mind, participants responded on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale to 15 
items that measured meaning-making about that event. The items assess 4 categories of 
meaning-making: meaning-made (e.g., “This event is personally meaningful to me”), 
difficulty with the event (“When I think about why this event happened I am confused”), 
consistency with self (“This event is a good reflection of who I am now”), and lessons 
and insight from the event ("I have learned lessons from this event”). See Appendix F for 





Miscellaneous Analyses: Manipulation Check and Degree 
of Effort and Difficulty Required 
 All general linear model analyses reported in the Results section use Pillai’s trace 
unless otherwise stated. We ran a repeated measures general linear model as a 
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manipulation check with item type (competence item vs. relatedness item), role (actor / 
target), and foregrounded psychological need (competence event vs. relatedness event) as 
within-subject’s variables and scores on the two items from the Basic Needs General 
Questionnaire as dependent variables. Thus, we again tested whether competence and 
relatedness foregrounding events were associated with different patterns of means on our 
competence and relatedness items from the Basic Needs General questionnaire (Deci et 
al., 2001). We found the expected significant crossover interaction, F (1,138) = 18.12, p 
< .01, such that when individuals imagined a competence event, their scores were higher 
on the competence item (EMM = 2.99) than the relatedness item (EMM = 2.73) and when 
individuals imagined a relatedness event, scores were higher on the relatedness item 
(EMM = 2.81) than the competence item (EMM = 2.31). After recalling competence 
events, participants were more likely to report challenges to competence and after 
recalling relatedness events participants were more likely to report challenges to 
relatedness. 
 We then conducted a general linear model to test whether there were differences 
among the four events in how much effort participants reported the events required to 
vividly imagine and how difficult participants reported the events were to vividly 
imagine. Role (actor/target) and foregrounded psychological need 
(competence/relatedness) were within-subject’s independent variables. Degree of 
difficulty in vividly imagining and degree of effort required were dependent measures. 
There were no main effects of role, F (1,136) = 1.36, p = .25, or foregrounded 
psychological need F (1,136) = .84, p = .25, but there was an interaction of role by need 
on degree of difficulty in vividly imagining the event F (1,136) =9.24, p < .01. Pairwise 
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comparisons revealed that target/competence events were more difficult to vividly 
imagine (EMM = 1.66) than target/relatedness events (EMM = 1.51, p < .05). These 
results did not differ by age group, F (4,132) = .91, p = .46.   
 Also, unlike Study 1, we found a main effect of role on effort put forth imagining 
the experience F (1,135) = 61.41, p < .01, and a main effect of foregrounded need F 
(1,135) = 72.89, p < .01, and those main effects were qualified by a significant role by 
foregrounded need interaction, F (1,135) = 42.46, p < .01. Pairwise comparisons showed 
that participants put forth more effort to imagine actor/competence events (EMM = 3.20) 
than actor/relatedness events (EMM = 1.96, p < .01) and marginally more effort to 
imagine target/competence events (EMM = 3.30) than target/relatedness events (EMM = 
3.18, p = .07). These results did not differ by age group, F (4,131) = 1.647, p = .17. These 
two sets of findings suggest that competence events may require more effort for adult 
participants from 20-69 to imagine than relatedness events and they may be more 
difficult to vividly imagine. These findings may also be specific to using a noncollegiate 
sample.   
 To determine the appropriateness of combining some of the threat type scales to 
reduce the number of tests of significance, we ran a principal components factor analysis 
including all of the adaptive functioning measures with varimax rotation and component 
extraction for eigen values greater than 1. Similar to Study 1, there were 13 components 
extracted with eigen values greater than one. Recall that in Study 2, I began with 16 
different adaptive functioning dependent measures (disregarding subjective vitality). 
Thus, principle components analyses again did not support combining scales. Consistent 
with Study 1, scores on the perceived choice and locus of control – internal scales were 
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again highly correlated for each event recalled (r’s > .60, p’s < .001). Again, we 
combined those scales into a single scale called perceived control. Likewise, scores on 
perceived self-worth, perceived intelligence, and perceived effectiveness at work were 
highly correlated (r’s > .48, p’s < .001), so we combined those scores into a single scale 
called perceived self-worth. No other scales were combined. 
 
 
Primary Analyses Study 2 
 Recall that higher scores on the dependent measures represent greater levels of 
threat. We again computed correlations among the dependent variables by event type. In 
general, the dependent variables were weakly to moderately related, again suggesting the 
appropriateness of using a single GLM.  
 To test whether the pattern of findings from Study 1 was similar in a more 
representative community sample of adults, we ran a single general linear model in which 
role (actor/target) and foregrounded psychological need (competence/relatedness) were 
again within-subjects independent variables and scores on the adaptive functioning 
measures, Self-alienation, Accepting the Influence of Others, Generalized Self-efficacy, 
Perceived Control, Loneliness, Empathy, Avoidance Motivation, Perceived Likeability, 
Inclusion of Others in Self, Interest in Psychological Mindedness, Willingness to Engage 
in Psychological Mindedness, Goal Re-engagement, and Perceived Self-worth were 
repeated measures dependent variables, and age was entered as a continuous independent 
variable.  
 Multivariate tests of within-subjects effects revealed a main effect of age F 
(13,110) = 2.04, p < .01, partial η2 =. 20, no main effects of role, F (13, 110) = 1.30, p = 
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.23, a main effect of foregrounded psychological need, F (13,110) = 2.22, p = .01, partial 
η2 = .21, and a significant role by need interaction, F (13,110) = 1.81, p = .05, partial η2 
=.18 on threats to adaptive functioning. Role by age, F (13, 110) = .50, p = .92, 
foregrounded need by age, F (13, 110) = .65, p = .80, and role by foregrounded need by 
age, F (13, 110) = .62, p = .83 interactions were not significant. In subsequent analyses 
we included gender and order as between-subjects factors and found no gender 
differences, F (13, 107) = .73, p = .73, or order effects F (13, 107) = .72, p = .74 on levels 
of threat to adaptive functioning. Results presented below were from analyses that did not 
include gender or order.  
 
 
Main Effect of Age on Threats to Adaptive Functioning 
 
 We followed up the main effect of age on adaptive functioning measures by 
computing correlations between age and levels of threat averaged across event types 
(e.g., a correlation between age and the average level of threats to self-alienation in 
actor/competence, target/competence, actor/relatedness, and target/relatedness events).  
Table 4 shows that age was broadly negatively associated with average levels of threat 
perceived across events. Age was most strongly negatively associated with threats to self-
efficacy, goal re-engagement after failures, and with the composite measure of threats to 
self-worth (that includes threats to perceived intelligence, perceived self-worth, and 
perceived effectiveness at work). There was only one case in which age was positively 
associated with threats (motivation to avoid those who have hurt one in the past) and that 
relationship was not statistically significant. As predicted, these results suggest that aging 
is associated with diminished perceptions of threats from negative life events. 
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Table 4. Correlations Between Average Levels of Threat Across Event Types and Age 
Study 2. 
 
Average Level of Threats Across Event Types Age 
Gen. Self-efficacy     -.33** 
Goal Re-engagement     -.30** 
Self-alienation -.12 
Psych. Minded Interest -.01 
Psych. Minded Willingness -.08 
Perceived Self-worth     -.22** 
Perceived Control     -.21** 
Empathy -.12 
Loneliness -.02 
Incl. of Others in Self -.10 
Perceived Self-Likeability    -.22** 
Influence of Others -.04 
Avoidance Motivation .13 





















   
	  
79
Main Effects of Foregrounded Psychological Needs on 
Threats to Adaptive Functioning 
 We followed up the multivariate main effect of foregrounded psychological need 
on threats to adaptive functioning measures with univariate tests. See Table 5 for 
estimated marginal means associated with the significance tests reported below. We 
anticipated that self-efficacy, goal re-engagement, self-alienation, psychological 
mindedness-interest, psychological mindedness-willingness, perceived control, and the 
composite measure of perceived worth (perceived intelligence, effectiveness, self-worth) 
would be more challenged by negative competence events than negative relatedness 
events. There was no difference on threats to self-efficacy, F (1, 122) = 1.02, p = .32, 
goal re-engagement, F (1, 122) = .56, p = .46, or self-alienation, F (1, 122) = .94, p = .34, 
psychological mindedness-interest, F (1, 122) = 2.69, p = .10, psychological mindedness 
– willingness, F (1, 122) = .06, p = .82, or perceived control, F (1, 122) = .01, p = .91 for 
competence and relatedness events. However, threats to perceived worth were stronger in 
competence than in relatedness events, F (1, 122) = 10.00, p < .01, partial η2 = .08 (see 
Table 5).  
 We anticipated that empathy, loneliness, inclusion of others in self, perceived 
likeability, influence of others, and avoidance motivation would be associated with 
higher levels of threat in negative relatedness events than negative competence events. 
Univariate tests revealed that there was no difference on level of threat to empathy, F (1, 
122) = .58, p = .45, for relatedness and competence events, that loneliness was worse in  
relatedness compared to competence events, F (1, 122) = 4.94, p < .05, partial η2 = .04 
(see Table 5), there was no difference on inclusion of others in self, F (1, 122) = 2.29, p = 
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Table 5. Test of Main Effects of Role and Foregrounded Psychological Need on 
Measures of Adaptive Functioning in Study 2 (Higher Values Represent Greater Threats). 
 
Dependent Measures Role Psychological Need 
  Actor Target Competence Relatedness 
Gen. Self-eff. 3.05 (.09)** 2.90 (.10)** 3.00 (.10) 2.91 (.09) 
Goal Re-engage. 2.99 (.10)** 2.72 (.10)** 2.80 (.10) 2.92 (.10) 
Self-alienation 1.30 (.03)** 1.21 (.02)** 1.24 (.03) 1.27 (.03) 
Psych. Minded Int. 1.68 (.03)** 1.40 (.03)** 1.51 (.03) 1.58 (.03) 
Psych. Minded Will. 1.46 (.03) 1.45 (.03) 1.43 (.03)* 1.48 (.03)* 
Perceived Self-worth 1.44 (.03)** 1.32 (.03)** 1.44 (.03)* 1.32 (.03)* 
Perceived Con. 2.95 (.08) 2.96 (.09) 3.00 (.09) 2.91 (.08) 
Empathy 2.85 (.09)** 3.13 (.10)** 3.10 (.10)** 2.90 (.10)** 
Loneliness 1.29 (.03) 1.28 (.03) 1.24 (.03)** 1.33 (.03)** 
IOSS 3.13 (.16)** 3.95 (.10)** 3.82 (.08)** 3.26 (.17)** 
Perceived Self-Like. 2.96 (.08)** 2.59 (.08)** 2.70 (.08)** 2.85 (.08)** 
Influence of Others 1.41 (.03) 1.40 (.03) 1.42 (.03) 1.38 (.03) 
Avoidance Motiv. 2.42 (.11)** 3.02 (.11)** 2.61 (.10)** 2.83 (.11)** 
Note: Gen. Self-eff. = Generalized Self-efficacy; Goal Re-engage. = Goal Re-
engagement; Psych. Minded Int. = Psychological Mindedness Interest; Psych. Minded 
Will. = Psychological Mindedness Willingness; Perceived Con. = Perceived Control; 
IOSS = Inclusion of Others in Self; Perceived Like. = Perceived Likeability of self; 
Avoidance Motiv. = Avoidance Motivation. Estimated marginal means are presented 
above. ** indicates difference on adaptive functioning measure is significant at the p < 













   
	  
81
.13, perceived likeability, F (1, 122) = 2.09, p = .15, being influenced by others, F (1, 
122) = .66, p = .42, or avoidance motivation for relatedness and competence events, F (1, 
122) = 2.08, p = .15. These findings indicate that negative events which foreground 
competence needs are more likely to threaten perceptions of the self associated with 
intelligence, effectiveness, and worth than negative events that foreground relatedness. 
They also indicate that negative events that foreground relatedness are more likely to be 
associated with feeling lonely than negative events that foreground competence 
(replicating a finding from Study 1).  
 
 
Main Effects of Role (Actor/Target) on Threats to Adaptive Functioning 
 Although multivariate tests did not reveal a significant main effect of role, 
univariate tests showed that motivation to avoid those who caused one harm in the past 
was stronger in target than in actor events, F (1, 122) = 4.53, p < .05, partial η2 = .04. 
 
Interactions of Role and Foregrounded Psychological Need on 
Threats to Adaptive Functioning 
 We expected that actor/competence events would be associated with higher levels 
of threat to self-efficacy than target/competence, actor/relatedness, or target/relatedness. 
We expected that recalling a target/relatedness events would be associated with the 
highest levels of loneliness compared to the other three events.  
 Univariate tests revealed that there was no role by foregrounded psychological 
need interaction for threats to self-efficacy, F (1, 122) = 1.55, p = .22, or loneliness F (1, 
122) = 1.97, p = .16 (see Table 5).   
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 Univariate tests revealed a significant role by foregrounded psychological need 
interaction on perceived likeability, F (1, 122) = 8.31, p < .01, partial η2 = .06. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that likeability was more threatened by actor/relatedness events  
 (EMM =3.19) than target/relatedness events (EMM = 2.51, p < .01) and there was not a 
significant difference in likeability between actor/competence (EMM = 2.73) and 
target/competence (EMM = 2.66) events.  
 There was also a significant role by foregrounded psychological need interaction 
on level of threat from influence of others, F (1, 122) = 7.12, p < .01, partial η2 = .06. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that people felt more influenced by others in 
actor/relatedness (EMM = 1.42) than target/relatedness (EMM = 1.35, p = .01) events and 
there was no difference in feeling influence from others in actor/competence (EMM = 
1.40) and target/competence (EMM = 1.44) events. People’s perceptions of likeability 
were more threatened and people felt more influenced by others in actor/relatedness 
events compared to target/relatedness events.  
 
 
Main Effects of Well-being and Emotional Stability on the Relations Between  
 
Threatening Events and Measures of Adaptive Functioning 
 
 To examine whether or not we could replicate Study 1 findings with well-being 
and emotional stability, we ran a second general linear model that matched the 
specifications of the general linear model that included well-being and emotional stability 
run in Study 1. Thus, this GLM did not include age. Like Study 1, this GLM had role 
(actor/target) and foregrounded psychological need (competence/relatedness) as within-
subjects independent variables and participants’ scores on the same 13 adaptive 
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functioning measures above were included as repeated measures dependent variables and 
we included continuous measures of psychological well-being and emotional stability 
(neuroticism from the Big 5 personality inventory) as independent variables (age was not 
included).  
 Analyses revealed main effects of psychological well-being, F (13, 109) = 3.92, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .32, and emotional stability, F (13, 109) = 2.65, p <.01, partial η2 
=.24. Consistent with Study 1, there was no longer significant main effects of role, F (13, 
109) = 1.14, p > .05, or foregrounded psychological need, F (13, 109) = .72, p > .05, on 
levels of threat to adaptive functioning. There was no longer a significant role by 
foregrounded psychological need interaction, F (13, 109) = .83, p > .05. The interactions 
of well-being by role F (13, 109) = 1.31, p > .05, and well-being by foregrounded need, F 
(13, 109) = .71, p > .05, were not significant nor were the interactions of emotional 
stability by role, F (13, 109) = 1.24, p > .05, or emotional stability by foregrounded need, 
F (13, 109) = 1.33, p > .05. The three-way interactions (well-being by role by 
foregrounded need, and emotional stability by role by foregrounded need) were also not 
significant, F (13, 109) = .62, p > .05; F (13, 109) = .95, p > .05, respectively.  
 However, univariate tests revealed a significant emotional stability by role 
interaction on level of threat to goal re-engagement, F (1, 121) = 4.38, p < .05, partial η2 
=.04, and higher scores on loneliness F (1, 121) = 4.98, p < .05, partial η2 =.04. Initially, 
we followed these findings up with correlational analyses and we describe those next. 
However, as in Study 1, we also computed median splits on well-being, and emotional 
stability (and age given the main effects of age above), and we describe those findings in 
exploratory analyses below. 
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 Our first pass with correlations showed that the negative relationship between 
emotional stability and threats to goal re-engagement was stronger for actor (r = -.47, p < 
.01) than for target events (r = -.33, p < .01) and that the negative relationship between 
emotional stability and loneliness was stronger for target (r = -.33, p < .01) than for actor 
events (r = -.25, p < .01).  
 In sum, after adjusting for person characteristics (individual differences in well-
being and emotional stability), event characteristics (role and the foregrounded 
psychological need) are largely not associated with specific types of adaptive functioning 
threats, and individual differences in emotional stability show relationships with the 
degree to which individuals report threats to goal re-engagement and levels of loneliness 
when they are the actor vs. target.      
 
 
Exploratory Analyses: Further Examination of the Relationships Between 
Individual Differences and Threat Types 
 As in Study 1, to further explore the main effects of well-being and emotional 
stability on levels of threat, we computed each person’s average score for each adaptive 
functioning threat (e.g., mean self-alienation level) across event types (actor/competence, 
target/competence, actor/relatedness, and target/relatedness) and each person’s variability 
for each adaptive functioning threat (e.g., variance self-alienation) across event types.  
 We calculated median splits for well-being and emotional stability to categorize 
participants as high and low scorers on those measures. We also calculated a median split  
for age to dichotomize our sample in to younger and older adults. Median age in the 
sample was 42 years old. We tested whether participants who scored high vs. low on 
   
	  
85
well-being, high vs. low on emotional stability, and who were older and younger differed 
in variability for each adaptive functioning threat (e.g., variance self-alienation) across 
event types. See Table 3 for a summary of averages and Table 6 for correlations between 
average threat levels and individual difference measures.   
 We ran a general linear model with variability on the adaptive functioning 
measures as dependent variables and dichotomized well-being, emotional stability, and 
age as between-subject’s independent variables. Age and emotional stability were 
significantly correlated (r = .16, p = .05), as were emotional stability and well-being (r = 
.55, p < .01), but age and well-being were not significantly correlated (r = .06, p > .05). 
 Multivariate tests revealed no main effects of well-being, F (12, 122) = 1.00, p = 
.50, emotional stability, F (12, 122) = 1.70, p = .08, or age F (13, 109) = .73, p = .72, on 
variability in levels of adaptive functioning threats. Multivariate tests revealed no 
significant interactions of well-being by emotional stability, F (12, 122) = .61, p = .83, 
well-being by age, F (12, 122) = 1.27, p = .25, or emotional stability by age F (12, 122) = 
.63, p = .81, on variability in levels of adaptive functioning threats. There was a 
significant well-being by emotional stability by age interaction, F (12, 122) = 2.02, p < 
.05.  
 Tests of between-subjects effects revealed that variability in levels of 
psychological mindedness-interest threats was larger for people who scored high on well-
being (EMM = 1.72) than those who scored low on well-being (EMM = 1.23), F (1,133) 
= 4.09, p < .05. Variability in levels of threats to feeling empathy for others was larger for 
people who scored high on emotional stability (EMM = .89) compared to those who  
scored low (EMM = .44) on emotional stability F (1,133) = 8.90, p < .01. Variability in  
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Table 6. Average Levels of Threat Across Events and Their Correlations With  
Well-being and Emotional Stability Study 2. 
 
Dependent Measures Avg. Score (SD) Well-Being Emo. Stability 
Gen. Self-eff. 2.96 (.97) -.44** -.48** 
Goal Re-engage. 2.86 (1.07) -.46** -.42** 
Self-alienation 1.72 (.76) -.50** -.35* 
Psych. Minded. Int. 2.58 (.88) -.19* -.22** 
Psych. Minded Will. 2.27 (.99) -.37** -.40** 
Perceived Self-worth 1.38 (.27) -.52** -.40** 
Perceived Con. 2.96 (.87) -.53** -.39** 
Empathy 3.00 (1.00) -.27** -.14 
Loneliness 1.78 (.96) -.52** -.30* 
IOSS 3.56 (1.02) -.23** -.21* 
Perceived Self-Like. 2.79 (.85) -.44** -.30** 
Influence of Others 2.09 (.88) -.30** -.25** 
Avoidance Motiv. 2.66 (1.05) -.25* -.12 
Note: Gen. Self-eff. = Generalized Self-efficacy; Goal Re-engage. = Goal Re-
engagement; Psych. Minded Int. = Psychological Mindedness Interest; Psych. Minded 
Will. = Psychological Mindedness Willingness; Perceived Con. = Perceived Control; 
IOSS = Inclusion of Others in Self; Perceived Self-Like. = Perceived Self-Likeability. 
Emo. Stability = Emotional Stability;  
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levels of goal re-engagement threats was larger for people who scored high on emotional 
stability (EMM = .84) compared to those who scored low (EMM = .52) on emotional 
stability F (1,133) = 4.18, p < .05. 
 Tests of between-subject’s effects showed that the three-way interaction of well-
being, emotional stability, and age was significant for variability in levels of self-
alienation threats, F (1,133) = 7.03, p < .01, variability in levels of influence from others, 
F (1,133) = 5.44, p < .05, and variability in levels of loneliness, F (1,133) = 5.50, p < .05. 
To follow up the three-way interaction, we first split our sample along age. We examined 
variability in levels of self-alienation threats, variability in levels of influence from others 
threats, and variability in levels of loneliness as a function of combinations of high and 
low well-being and high and low emotional stability for the younger adult group and then 
for the older adult group. Thus, we ran two GLM’s (one for young adults and one for 
older adults) with variability in threats to self-alienation, variability in threats of influence 
from others, and variability in threats of loneliness as dependent variables, and 
dichotomized well-being and emotional stability as between-subjects independent 
variables.  
 For the younger adults (20 to 41-year-olds), univariate tests of the simple effects 
of well-being at each level of emotional stability revealed that there were only significant 
differences for variability in levels of loneliness threats, F (1,65) = 4.43, p < .05 (thus we 
do not discuss variability in threats to self-alienation and influence from others). A 
significant difference among variability on loneliness threats was found within the low 
emotional stability group. Young adults who scored low on emotional stability and low 
on well-being had greater variability in threats to loneliness (EMM = .63) than young 
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adults who scored low on emotional stability but high on well-being (EMM = .11).  
 For older adults (42 to 69-year-olds), univariate tests of the simple effects of well-
being at each level of emotional stability revealed significant differences for variability in 
levels of self-alienation threats, F (1,68) = 7.10, p = .01, and significant differences for 
variability in levels of influence from others threats F (1,68) = 4.92, p < .05 (thus we do 
not discuss variability in threats to loneliness). For older adults, significant differences 
were within the high emotional stability group. Older adults who scored high on 
emotional stability and low on well-being had greater variability in levels of self-
alienation threats (EMM = .99) than older adults who scored high on emotional stability 
and high on well-being (EMM = .17). Likewise, older adults who scored high on 
emotional stability and low on well-being had greater variability in levels of influence 
from others (EMM = .67) than older adults who scored high on emotional stability and 
high on well-being (EMM = .22).  
 These findings suggest that the degree to which people feel threats across events 
are tied to complex combinations of individual differences like well-being, emotional 
stability, and age, which may index changes in socio-emotional priorities and competence 





 In Study 2, we tested age differences on perceived threats in our four different 
types of negative events. We tested whether main effects of foregrounded psychological 
need on threats to adaptive functioning would be primarily attributable to relatedness 
being foregrounded as opposed to competence, as they were in Study 1. We tested 
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whether main effects of role on threats were primarily attributable to being the actor as 
opposed to target, as they were in Study 1. We tested whether main effects and 
interaction effects of foregrounded need and role were eliminated when we included 
individual differences in well-being and emotional stability and age using a more 
generalizable sample of community participants.  
 
 
Main Effects of Age 
 We found a main effect of age on threats to adaptive functioning. Follow up 
correlations revealed negative relationships between age and all threat types except for 
avoidance motivation (positive but not statistically significant). This pattern broadly 
suggests that factors associated with aging may be protective against threats from 
negative events. We found statistically significant negative relationships between age and 
generalized self-efficacy, goal re-engagement, perceived self-worth (combination of 
perceived intelligence, effectiveness, and worth), perceived control, and perceived self-
likeability. Later in this discussion and in the General Discussion we examine factors 
associated with aging in relation to two models of adaptive functioning in adulthood, the 
Competence-Environmental Press Model (Lawton & Nahemow, 1973) and 
Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (Carstensen et al., 1999).  
 
 
Event Characteristics – Foregrounded Psychological Needs 
 Relatedness events were associated with greater feelings of loneliness than 
competence events, whereas competence events were associated with greater levels of 
threat to our composite measure of self-worth. 
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 The items assessing loneliness prompted participants to think about the extent to 
which the event that they had just imagined for 2 minutes made them realize that they 
lack companionship, that they are no longer close to anyone, and feel isolated from 
important others. We would expect that negative events which foreground relatedness 
needs would be associated with higher reports of loneliness than negative events which 
foreground competence needs. That this is the only main effect that held across the two 
studies suggests that no matter one’s age in adulthood and whether one acted to harm the 
relationship or was the target of harm, imagining negative relatedness events makes 
people feel lonely.  
 In addition, our composite measure of self-worth (which contained items about 
perceptions of effectiveness at work, intelligence, and being a person of worth) mapped 
well on to agency-related concerns that we anticipated would be more threatened by 
negative events that foregrounded competence than relatedness needs. That is what we 
found.  
 Whereas Study 1 results showed that when there was an effect of foregrounded 
need on adaptive functioning measures, it was more typical for relatedness events to be 
associated with higher levels of threat than competence events. Study 2 showed other 
forms of adaptive functioning that negative competence events threaten. These findings 
also suggest that although our older adults appear more resilient to adaptive functioning 
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Event Characteristics – Role 
 
 Unlike Study 1, in Study 2, we did not find multivariate main effects of role on 
adaptive functioning threats (see Table 7 for the primary findings across studies). In 
Study 2, we did find (univariate analyses) that negative target events were more strongly 
associated with a desire to avoid a person that harmed one in the past than actor events 
were. One explanation of these findings may have to do with the ages of participants in 
Study 2. Perhaps by prioritizing positive social experiences, older adults may be more 
likely to distance themselves from someone who has harmed him or her in the past (target 
event), compared to when older adults have acted to harm another person (actor event). 
 This interpretation is supported by the idea that we did not find this difference on 
avoidance motivation between target and actor events in Study 1. 
Whereas Study 1 was comprised of young adults (average age 22.46), Study 2 was made 
up of people aged 20 to 69 (average age 43.32). 
 Although we conceptualized having a desire to avoid those who caused one harm 
as a threat to adaptive functioning (because that motivation may preclude attempts to 
repair relationships), from another view, such a desire could be construed as reasonable 
or even as functioning adaptively. As we introduced earlier, with its emphasis on 
prioritizing close relationships with others and emotion regulation as time-horizons 
shorten, Socioemotional Selectivity Theory may predict that compared to younger adults, 
older adults would be more likely to endorse wanting to avoid those who have harmed 
them in the past (target events). This may be especially so if the older adult did not  
consider the person who harmed him or her as part of his or her “inner social circle.” 
 
Unfortunately, when prompting avoidance motivation, we did not stipulate the type of 
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Table 7. Overall Pattern of Findings in Study 1 and Study 2.  
  
 Study 1 Study 2 (with age as I.V.) 




Self-eff. A > T* NS NS NS NS NS 
Goal Re-engage. NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Self-Alienation A > T* NS NS NS NS NS 
Psych. Minded. Int. A > T* R > C * NS NS NS NS 
Psych. Minded. Will. NS R > C * NS NS NS NS 
Self-worth N/A N/A N/A NS C > R* NS 
Perceived Con. NS NS Sig.* NS NS NS 
Empathy T >A* NS NS NS NS NS 
Loneliness NS R > C* NS NS R > C* NS 
IOSS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Perceived Like. A > T* R > C* NS NS NS Sig.* 
Influence of Others NS NS NS NS NS Sig.* 
Avoidance Motiv. NS NS NS T > A* NS NS 
Note: Gen. Self-eff = Generalized Self-efficacy; Goal Re-engage. = Goal Re-
engagement; Psych. Minded Int. = Psychological Mindedness Interest; Psych. Minded 
Will. = Psychological Mindedness Willingness; IOSS = Inclusion of Others in Self; 
Perceived Like. = Perceived Likeability; Avoidance Motiv. = Avoidance Motivation. A = 
Actor; T = Target; R = Relatedness; C = Competence; N/A = Not Applicable; Sig. = 
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person (i.e., one from a close social relationship vs. not) that participants were to recall so 
we can only speculate about this possible explanation. Furthermore, we note that other 
“adaptive functions” such as psychological mindedness might also be more complex. For 
example, being psychologically minded about negative events could be associated with 
ruminating about such events. 
 
 
Role by Foregrounded Need Interactions 
 In Study 2, we found that participants’ perceptions of likeability were more 
threatened and participants felt more influenced by others when he or she was the actor in 
relatedness events compared to when he or she was the target in relatedness events. There 
was not a significant difference on threats to those adaptive functioning measures 
between actor/competence and target/competence events. Thus, the extent to which 
threats to likeability and feeling influenced by others is associated with negative 
relatedness events depends on whether one is the actor or target.  
 Participants may report feeling less likeable after recalling doing something that 
hurt an important relationship (relatedness event) because in addition to one’s self, the 
experience of the victim may be definitional to a negative actor/relatedness event. To the 
extent that this sort of event leads one to reflect on the affective or physical harm caused 
to the victim, one may naturally feel “unlikeable.”  
 It seems less apparent why, compared to being the target in a relatedness event, 
being the actor was associated with higher levels of threat to feeling influenced by others. 
Recall that influence of others is a subscale of the “Authentic Self Scale,” which in total 
assesses the degree to which we behave in ways that are consistent with the authentic self 
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or not and the Influence of Others component of the scale assesses the extent to which 
our authenticity is constrained by others. It may be the case that people tend to perceive 
that others contributed to their own actions (i.e., there may be some provocation from 
others) when they think about doing something that undermined a relationship (negative 
actor/relatedness events). Alternatively, it may be causing someone else pain, and 
perhaps having to manage one’s own feelings in relation to the pain that the victim has 




Individual Differences in Well-being, Emotional Stability and 
Their Interactions With Age 
 Our Study 2 findings suggest that the degree to which people feel threats across 
events are tied to complex combinations of individual differences like well-being, 
emotional stability, and age (which may index changes in socio-emotional priorities and 
competence with stressors). As in Study 1, when we accounted for individual differences 
in well-being and emotional stability, the relationships between types of events and types 
of threats were largely no longer statistically significant. Instead, we found strong main 
effects of well-being and emotional stability on levels of threats.  
 Examining variability in levels of threat across event types, we found that 
variability in levels of threat to psychological mindedness-interest threats was larger for 
high well-being individuals than low well-being individuals. Variability in levels of 
threats to feeling empathy for others and goal re-engagement was tied to differences in 
emotional stability. Individuals in our study who were more emotionally stable reported 
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greater variability in levels of threats to empathy and levels of threats to goal re-
engagement across events. We also found interactions between our individual 
differences. Younger and older adults who differed on emotional complexity and well-
being differed on variability in their levels of threats to distinct forms of adaptive 
functioning. Young adults who scored low on emotional stability and low on well-being 
had greater variability in threats to loneliness than young adults who scored low on 
emotional stability but high on well-being. Older adults did not display that pattern of 
variability in levels of threat. 
 Older adults who scored high on emotional stability and low on well-being had 
greater variability in levels of self-alienation threats than older adults who scored high on 
emotional stability and high on well-being. Furthermore, older adults who scored high on 
emotional stability but low on well-being had greater variability in levels of influence 
from others threats than older adults who scored high on emotional stability and high on 
well-being. Younger adults did not display that pattern of variability in levels of threat.  
In total, the pattern of findings with individual differences point to the potential value of 
using more powerful idiographic techniques like latent profile analysis. Latent profile 
analysis would allow us to determine whether or not there are particular combinations of 
individual differences that map on to particular patterns of threats by events. This, 
idiographic, approach may allow us to specify what combination of characteristics (older 
adults who score high on well-being by low on emotional stability) are associated with 
perceiving certain levels of threats in certain events. This would mark a potentially 
















 Researchers have sometimes blended negative events when studying the 
relationship between meaning-making and adaptive functioning. That approach has 
resulted in mixed findings such that in some studies, positive forms of meaning-making 
(e.g., narrating growth from the event) predict adaptive outcomes (Bauer & Bonanno, 
2001; Mansfield et al., 2010; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001; 
McLean & Pratt, 2006; Pals, 2006), whereas in others, similar forms of meaning-making 
predict maladaptive outcomes (McLean, Breen, & Fournier, 2010; Sales, Merrill, & 
Fivush, 2013; Styers & Baker-Ward, 2013). Because events and meaning-making are 
complex, there are likely many reasons for these mixed findings.  
 We conducted two studies to assess the extent to which particular types of 
adaptive function threats (e.g., feeling lonely) mapped onto particular types of negative 
events. We reasoned that if different types of events created specific types of challenges, 
the same form of positive meaning-making could address the challenges of one event but 
fail to address the challenges associated with the another. Thus, understanding variability 
in goodness-of-fit between meaning-making and threats to adaptive functioning by event 
type may clarify contexts in which positive meaning-making works for people. 
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What We Know About Event-specific Threats  
to Adaptive Functioning 
 Table 7 showed the pattern of main effects across the two studies. The only event-
specific adaptive functioning threat that we found across the two studies was that 
negative relatedness events were associated with greater loneliness than negative 
competence events. Self-determination theory posits that the psychological need for 
relatedness is met when one feels meaningfully connected to others and feels that those 
important others recognize and value one’s authentic self. The current findings 
(consistent with intuition) suggest that for adults from 20 to 69 years old, and from 
undergraduates to community members, negative events that foreground relatedness lead 
to higher levels of loneliness than negative events that foreground competence. This 
makes sense in the Self-determination Theory framework because meeting the need for 
competence is argued to have little to do with social closeness and positive relationships. 
 Although the event differences that we looked at did not consistently map onto 
threat-level differences, we did succeed in finding that people generally rated these 
negative events as presenting some degree of threat to a variety of different forms of 
adaptive functioning (see Tables 2 and 5). Thus, people in our studies appeared to be 
reporting on events that were generally troubling in a variety of different ways.   
 
 
Individual Differences Matter for The Threat Levels That People 
Perceive From Negative Events 
 We found that well-being, emotional stability, and age mattered for the level of 
threat that people perceived from different types of negative events. We consistently 
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found that the majority of the variability in levels of threats to adaptive functioning across 
events was explained by individual differences in well-being and emotional stability. The 
strong main effects of well-being and emotional stability support the idea that the degree 
of threat to particular forms of adaptive functioning people experience are more tied to 
characteristics of individuals than to the (theoretical) “psychological needs” an event 
foregrounds or one’s role in the event. These findings are consistent with theories that 
focus on person-situation interaction (Funder, 2008; Lazarus & Folkman, 1997). 
Overall, high well-being and high emotional stability were also related to increased 
variability in levels of threats across events and decreased average levels of threats across 
events. This combination may suggest that high well-being and high emotional stability is 
generally associated with compartmentalization of threats by event, whereas low well-
being and low emotional stability may be generally associated with diffusion of threats 
by events. However, we need to conduct further studies to determine whether this is the 
case or not.  
 
 
The Importance of Age-related Changes in Perceptions of Threat by Event 
 In Study 2, we also found a main effect of age on threat-levels and correlational 
analyses indicated that increased age is generally associated with decreased levels of 
perceived threats across events. One approach to understanding the extent to which 
person-environment fit matters for adaptive functioning, the competence-environmental 
press model (Lawton & Nahemow, 1973; Nahemow, 2000), argues that to the extent that 
environmental press (stressors from our environments) does not exceed competence, 
people will display positive cognitions and emotions and function adaptively. As we age 
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in adulthood, we may gain important experience that expands our levels of competence in 
dealing with environmental press. For example, learning from our successful and 
unsuccessful attempts to negotiate work and relationship challenges may help us develop 
competence. Such experience may “pay off” for adults by helping them remain centered 
in their beliefs that they are efficacious, that they can and will re-engage in pursuing 
important goals, that they are worthwhile despite negative events, and that they have 
some degree of control in their lives and are likeable.  
 An alternative explanation for these negative relationships between age and 
threats to adaptive functioning is provided by Socioemotional Selectivity Theory 
(Carstensen et al., 1999). Researchers have shown that shortening time horizons, the 
decreasing subjective sense of time until natural death, matters for social motivation and 
emotional information processing (Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen & Frederickson, 1998).  
Work in this tradition has argued that age, though not causal, is highly correlated with 
shortened time horizons and the changes in socio-emotional priorities that go along with 
shortened time horizons. For example, younger men living with HIV prior to the 
introduction of antiretroviral medications held views of their social relationships that 
were more similar to elderly individuals than to younger individuals, and their priorities 
in those relationships were more similar to the elderly individuals.  
 The effect of shortened time horizons is that unlike younger adults (who have 
longer time horizons, and consequently spend more time gathering new information and 
planning the future), older adults prioritize regulating their emotions in ways that 
maximize their psychological well-being. Shifts in socio-emotional priorities may help 
older adults avoid negative events, or cease thinking about negative events when they 
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cannot be changed. Importantly, those benefits may not extend to much more elderly 
individuals. The cognitive and physical changes associated with the very end of life may 
preclude those benefits. Nevertheless, in Study 2, we showed that at least until age 69, 
people report lower levels of threats across different types of negative events.  
 We also found in Study 2 that the combination of “levels” of individual 
differences (e.g., high well-being and low emotional stability) can have different 
implications for variability in the “levels” of threat for young and older adults. Indeed, 
younger and older adults who differed on emotional complexity and well-being differed 
on variability in levels of self-alienation threats and on levels of threats of being 




 Although we found that specific features of events do explain some of the 
variability in the levels of threat that people perceive in different types of events, the 
current findings strongly suggest that individual differences matter more for those 
perceptions of threat. Thus, it may be especially illuminating to take a more “person-
centered approach” to analyzing these data. The person-centered approach admonishes 
(Magnusson, 1998) that understanding the totality of the individual rather than focusing 
on single “variables in isolation” is a more fruitful approach to understanding the 
psychological lives of individuals. Thus, the person-centered approach focuses on the 
combination of an individual’s psychological, physical, emotional, cognitive, and cultural 
processes, because according to this approach, “who the individual” is can only be known 
by examining the dynamic interaction of each of these parts.  
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 Though beyond what can be accomplished within the designs of the current 
studies, taking a more holistic, person-centered approach is an exciting possible direction. 
The results from the current studies suggest that perhaps the best way to understand how 
events are tied to types of adaptive functioning threats is to understand more about the 
individual. Indeed, our findings suggest that younger and older people who differ in 
unique ways on well-being and emotional complexity perceive threats differently for 
what were ostensibly similar types of events. Indeed, they may not perceive these events 
as similar at all. Our findings also suggest the possibility that people who are at similar 
standings on individual differences may perceive similar levels of adaptive function 
threats in similar types of negative events. Thus, a typological approach to persons may 
help us understand who experiences what types of threats when.   
 Latent profile analysis, a person-centered approach, is one technique that we 
might use to determine whether or not some people are similar in the types of threats that 
they experience in particular negative events. Latent profile analysis is used with 
continuous variables and is a method for finding subtypes of related classes of individuals 
from multivariate data. The goal then is to find out whether or not there are a certain 
number of groups that characterize one’s data. For our data, it may the case that older, 
high-highs (adults older than 42 who are high in well-being and emotional stability) are 
qualitatively different in terms of the degree to which they experience threats from events 
compared to the young, low-lows (adults younger than 42 who are low in well-being and 
emotional stability).  
 Furthermore, we could potentially use other measures of individual differences 
that we collected (e.g., trait hostility, and self-compassion in Study 2) to characterize our 
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participants. The risk of latent profile analysis is that taking a classification approach like 
this obviously creates comparisons among people (categorizes them in groups) that may 
mask the individuality of persons in those groups. Nevertheless, this approach could be 
valuable. It could help move us beyond examining variables in isolation (or probing 3-
way interactions as we did in Study 2) to even more closely examining how unique 
combinations of person characteristics may make people similar in the degree to which 




 In Study 2, we found that the participants who we dropped from the sample were 
lower on conscientiousness than those who were kept in the sample for final analyses. 
Consequently, the findings from Study 2 may only be generalizable to those community 
dwelling adults who are high on trait conscientiousness. A similar limitation may be that 
using online data collection methods may limit the population of adults to which we can 
generalize (perhaps only to those who regularly use computers as MTurk workers 
online). Past work shows that MTurk participants provide data that are as high-quality as 
undergraduate participants (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). However, it is 
possible that MTurk participants do differ in some meaningful way from the general 
population of adults in the United States.  
 We also did not anticipate that the relatedness and competence events would 
require adaptive functioning threats that were so closely about self-perceptions of 
intelligence and effectiveness at work. It was not until in Study 2, when we added those 
questions as a measure of adaptive functioning, that we were able to find differences on 
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threat types between negative events that foregrounded either competence or relatedness. 
However, since Study 2 used community dwelling, as opposed to college students, in the 
sample, it is possible that the difference among competence and relatedness events on 
threats to perceived intelligence, effectiveness at work, and self-worth has something to 
do with this shift in sample make up. We cannot fully disentangle this finding with the 
current data. Analyzing relationships between events that foreground competence or 
relatedness needs and threat types with only the 20-year-olds in Study 2 leaves us with 
little power to detect effects and thus compare to the young adults in Study 1.  
We did not collect data on employment status, or whether our MTurk participants were 
students or not. These would have been useful data to have as they may have allowed us 
to explore relationships between negative competence events and types of work 
participants were engaged in. Knowing whether or not the 20-year-old group in the 
MTurk sample were students would have given us better grounds to compare the Study 1 
participants to the Study 2 young adults.  
 As of the writing of this document, we have not yet completed coding of the data 
for time since event (this work is underway). We will want to control for time since the 
event to make sure that older and younger adults do not differ on threats perceived if they 
differ on the ages of the event memories that they nominated. Similarly, we did not 
obtain memories as they happened; rather, we got memories of past events when people 
participated. Thus, past meaning-making about these events may change the level of 
threat that people feel when they recall them. To the extent that individual differences in 
well-being and emotional stability are associated with different ways of making meaning 
that may help put negative events in the past (or let them continue to be troubling), those 
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individual differences in meaning-making may account for differences in perceived levels 
of threat.  
 Another possible limitation of our studies is that collecting all of our data online 
in a questionnaire/survey format led to common method variance. Thus, it is possible that 
the online format of answering questionnaires may have affected participants’ 
responding, such that patterns of intercorrelations among test items could differ compared 




 We set out to examine whether people experience specific types of threats when 
they experience specific types of negative events. Initial evidence suggested that specific 
types of threats were linked to specific event features such as whether the event 
foregrounded competence or relatedness or one was the actor or target in the event. 
However, when we accounted for individual differences in well-being, emotional 
stability, and age, ties between threats and events were largely severed. Thus, whereas we 
began with the idea that threats might be “event-based,” these studies indicate that 
perceived threats from negative events are more person-based.  
 The implications of this set of findings for future work are twofold. First, it may 
be fruitful to use idiographic methods to try and determine whether some types of people 
(but not others) perceive similar types of threats in some types of negative events. 
Second, to the extent that people do cluster in perceiving specific threats in specific 
events, beneficial meaning-making about negative events will likely also be an 
idiographic process (McLean & Mansfield, 2011). Thus, to more fully disentangle when 
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and why meaning-making works to produce positive adaptation to negative life events, 
we may need to examine whether the meanings particular people make fit the threats that 













































 Prior to multivariate analysis, all measures were examined (through various SPSS 
commands) for missing values, accuracy of data entry, outliers, and fit between 
distributions and assumption of multivariate analysis (see Table 8). Of the original 183 
participants, 4 missed large portions of the survey. One participant (ID. 69) was missing 
13.2% of the data (34 total items). That person did not respond to any of the adaptive 
functioning items for the actor-competence threat because she reported that she could not 
think of such an event. Another person (ID. 160) was missing 17.2% of the data (44 
items). She also reported not being able to think of an actor-competence threat and failed 
to respond to 10 other items scattered through the data set. One person (ID. 81) was 
missing 52.7% of the data (135 total items) because she could only recall a target 
relatedness event and had sporadic missing data elsewhere. Another person (ID. 18) was 
missing 16.4% of the data (42 total items). That person nominated an actor competence 
event. However, he or she failed to answer numerous questions regarding the event and 
had sporadic missing data elsewhere. Participants 18, 69, 81, and 160 were dropped from 
analyses.  
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Table 8: Assumptions of Normality: Skewness Z-scores by Event Type Study 1. 
 
 Actor/Comp. Target/Comp. Actor/Related. Target/Related. 
Self-Alienation 6.10* 6.01* 6.01* 8.15* 
Influence of Others 2.78 3.28 2.38 2.81 
Gen. Self-eff. 0.70 2.17 .86 1.38 
Perceived Con. -.039 .69 .51 .31 
UCLA Loneliness 7.21* 7.12* 5.05* 6.03* 
Davis Empathy .15 -.40 .62 -.27 
Avoidance Motiv. 1.73 .69 1.13 .78 
Perceived Like. 1.53 2.23 -.25 1.97 
IOSS .42 .57 1.12 .47 
Psych. Minded. Int. -.027 1.56 -2.49 .97 
Psych. Minded. Will. 1.34 2.59 1.14 1.61 
Goal Re-Engage.  1.43 2.38 2.19 1.95 
Note: Gen. Self-eff. = Generalized Self-efficacy; Perceived Con. = Perceived Control; 
Psych. Minded. Int. = Psychological Mindedness Interest; Psych. Minded. Will. = 
Psychological Mindedness Willingness; IOSS = Inclusion of Others in Self; Goal Re-
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 We then used Little’s MCAR (Missing Completely At Random) test to formally 
test the assumption that missing data in the file for the remaining 179 participants were 
missing completely at random. Descriptives from this test showed that 4 people (2.2% of 
the sample tested) failed to respond to interest in psychological mindedness for the actor 
relatedness event and 4 people failed to respond to the perceived likeability item for the 
target relatedness event. All other items had fewer than 4 people fail to respond, and 
missing items were sporadically scattered throughout the data set. Indeed, 160 individuals 
(89.4%) had no missing data on any measures of adaptive functioning, and 17 individuals 
(9.5%) failed to complete at most one adaptive functioning measure across the four 
events.   
 Little’s MCAR test was not statistically significant, χ2 = 403.72 (22,133), p = 
1.00, suggesting that the data for the sample of 179 participants were missing completely 
at random. However, as noted above, multivariate analyses were conducted on the 125 
individuals who accurately recalled all events that fit with the type of event prompted for.  
For those 125 individuals, I checked for errors in the data file by looking for plausible 
minimum and maximum values and means and standard deviations for each scale. All 
values were plausible. There were no inaccuracies in moving data from Qualtrics to 
SPSS. All scale scores for the dependent variables were accurately computed as averages 
from the individual items. 
 We then screened the adaptive functioning, dependent measures to determine 
whether they were normally distributed. I screened for outliers at the same time. Because 
my analyses were done on grouped data (MANOVA), outliers on the adaptive 
functioning measures were screened separately for each of the four event groups 
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(Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). I assessed the distribution of the variables by examining 
histograms with normal curves imposed over the data for each variable tested. I also 
computed z-scores for the skewness and kurtosis statistics for each variable. Skewness z-
scores greater than +/- 3.29 warrant rejection of the null hypothesis that values on that 
variable are normally distributed (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007; West, Finch, & Curran, 
1995). Thus, I screened for variables with skewness z-scores greater than +/-3.29. I also 
examined expected normal probability plots and detrended expected normal probability 
plots for each adaptive functioning measure (by group) and each individual differences 
measure.  
 We used box and whisker plots to look for outliers on the variables of interest. For 
actor/competence, outliers were found on self-alienation (1 case), and UCLA Loneliness 
(1 case). For target/competence, outliers were found on UCLA Loneliness (2 cases). For 
actor/relatedness, there were no such cases, and for target/relatedness, outliers were found 
on self-alienation (2 cases). All outliers were greater than +3.29 standard deviations from 
the mean. Examination of box and whisker plots after data transformation showed that 
the outliers were no longer as extreme deviations from means as they were originally. 
Thus, those few individuals whose scores had been larger outliers before transformation 
were kept in the data set. 
 We transformed all variables that were substantially positively skewed (at +/- 3.29 
or greater) by taking the square root of the values on that variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). The square root transformation also has the salutary effect of reducing the 
influence of the outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). I computed square root 
transformations for self-alienation, loneliness, and influence of others variables. Although 
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influence of others for target/competence events was the only group with skewness z-
score of greater than +3.29, I transformed influence of others for the other three events 
(actor/competence, actor/relatedness, target/relatedness) to maintain a similar magnitude 
of scores for testing differences between the means of influence of others on those events. 
Data were analyzed on the transformed variables for the 125 individuals who recalled all 





 Prior to multivariate analysis, all measures were again examined for missing 
values, accuracy of data entry, outliers, and fit between distributions and assumption of 
multivariate analysis (see Table 9). Of the original 224 participants, 6 missed large 
portions of the survey; 2 of these individuals were in the 20-year old age group. One of 
those individuals failed to respond to target competence adaptive functioning measures 
and 1 failed to respond to any of the adaptive functioning measures. Two individuals 
were in the 50-year old age group and 1 of those participants only responded to the target 
relatedness event prompt (disregarding), and failed to respond to the target competence 
and target relatedness prompts. Finally, 2 individuals were in the 60-year old age group 
and 1 provided responses to the adaptive functioning measures but did not provide 
anchoring titles for the memories, and 1 failed to respond to any of the adaptive 
functioning measures. As noted in the method section, I narrowed data analysis to only 
those individuals who recalled all four events correctly and to those who correctly 
answered the three attention check items.   
 Because of a problem with SPSS that neither we nor technology consultants in the  
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Table 9: Assumptions of Normality: Skewness Z-scores by Event Type Study 2. 
 
 Actor/Comp. Target/Comp. Actor/Related. Target/Related. 
Self-Alienation 6.51* 6.62* 5.16* 6.50* 
Influence of Others 3.03 2.31 3.94* 5.21* 
Gen. Self-eff. -.30 .58 .73 1.47 
Perceived Con. -0.19 -0.33 -0.32 -.42 
UCLA Loneliness 8.47* 7.35* 5.30* 6.64* 
Davis Empathy .16 .88 1.05 .36 
Avoidance Motiv. 3.35* .03 1.54 -.08 
Perceived Like. 1.16 1.56 -.82 -.84 
IOSS 3.04 1.85 2.75 2.57 
Psych. Minded. Int. 1.56 -3.35* 1.33 -4.00* 
Psych. Minded. Will. 3.97* 2.87 2.22 3.11 
Goal Re-engage. .08 .76 -0.25 1.74 
Perceived Worth 3.10 3.60* 3.65* 6.57* 
Note: Gen. Self-eff. = Generalized Self-efficacy; Perceived Con. = Perceived Control; 
Psych. Minded. Int. = Psychological Mindedness Interest; Psych. Minded. Will. = 
Psychological Mindedness Willingness; IOSS = Inclusion of Others in Self; Goal Re-
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social and behavioral computing center have been able to fix, we were unable to run 
Little’s MCAR test on Study 2 data. SPSS gave an error code (repeatedly when trying 
with different ways of conducting the test and trying on several different computers) that 
there was “insufficient memory to run the test.” To look for patterns and to assess 
problems with missing data, we created a measure of the number of items missed for each 
individual for each measure in the study. For the final 141 participants in Study 2, there 
appeared to be no consistent patterns of missing data (i.e., those participants did not 
appear to be filling in some items while missing large sections of responses elsewhere).  
For the final 141 individuals, I checked for errors in the data file by looking for plausible 
minimum and maximum values and means and standard deviations for each scale. All 
values were plausible. As in Study 1, there were no inaccuracies in moving data from 
Qualtrics to SPSS. All scale scores for the dependent variables were accurately computed 
as averages from the individual items. 
 We then followed the same procedure in Study 1 and screened the adaptive 
functioning, dependent measures to determine whether they were normally distributed. I 
screened for outliers at the same time. Because my analyses were done on grouped data 
(MANOVA), outliers on the adaptive functioning measures were screened separately for 
each of the four event groups (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). I computed z-scores for the 
skewness and kurtosis statistics for each variable. Skewness z-scores greater than +/- 3.29 
warrant rejection of the null hypothesis that values on that variable are normally 
distributed (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007; West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). We also examined 
expected normal probability plots and detrended expected normal probability plots for 
each adaptive functioning measure (by group) and each individual differences measure.  
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 We used box and whisker plots to look for outliers on the variables of interest. For 
actor/competence, outliers were found on self-alienation (7 cases), perceived likeability 
(4 cases), and UCLA Loneliness (9 cases). For target/competence, outliers were found on 
self-alienation (4 cases) and UCLA Loneliness (11 cases). For actor/relatedness, outliers 
were found on self-alienation (4 cases), and for target/relatedness, outliers were found on 
self-alienation (7 cases), UCLA Loneliness (4 cases), and perceived worth (7 cases).  
 We transformed variables that were substantially positively skewed (at +/- 3.29 or 
greater) by taking the square root of the values on that variable and transformed variables 
that were substantially negatively skewed by creating a new variable computed as the 
square root of a constant subtracted from the value each individuals score (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Those transformations reduce the influence of the outliers (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). I computed square root transformations for self-alienation, loneliness, and 
influence of others, perceived worth, and psychological mindedness willingness 
variables. I computed square root of 6 – X (where X is the value of each individual’s 
score) for psychological mindedness interest. I chose 6 because references suggest using 
a constant from which each score is subtracted so the smallest score is 1 ( Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007, p. 89).  
 Consistent with Study 1, in cases where a given variable was skewed for only one 
or two event types (such as psychological mindedness willingness in actor/competence 
events), I transformed all event types on that variable to maintain a similar magnitude of 
scores. Data were analyzed on the transformed variables for the 141 individuals who 
recalled all four events correctly and who responded correctly to all three attention check 













 The purpose of this research study is to examine how different types of negative 
events relate to different types of challenges. The results of this study will advance our 
understanding of what stressors are linked to what types of experiences. We are doing 
this study because knowing this information may help us understand why some forms of 
coping work for some types of negative events but not others. 
 This study will ask you to report on your views about different types of difficult 
experiences. You will be asked to think about different types of negative events. You will 
be asked to honestly respond to ways that those events made you feel and think. You will 
also be asked to fill out questionnaires about your self. You will write descriptions of 4 
events that you have experienced. Though some people report negative feelings after 
thinking about difficult experiences, there are no anticipated risks or discomfort 
associated with participation. University of Utah undergraduates, if you feel upset after 
the study and wish to talk to someone about your experiences please do not hesitate to 
contact the University of Utah Counseling Center at: 801-581-6826.  
 We cannot promise any direct benefit for taking part in this study. However, we 
hope that the information we get from this study will help develop a greater 
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understanding of how different negative events lead to different types of stressors. 
Knowing that may help us understand how people can effectively cope with daily 
stressors. You will receive 1.5 hours of research credit for engaging in this study. 
However, as an undergraduate if you choose not to participate in this or any other study 
you can get equivalent credit in alternative ways. See your specific instructor’s course 
syllabus for details.  
 Your data will be kept confidential. Participants will be assigned a unique study 
identification number. Any other identifying information associated with the unique ID 
number will be deleted monthly until data collection is completed. All computerized 
participant information will be kept in a password-protected database administered by the 
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Utah with access limited 
to the researcher and staff supervised by the researcher. Reference to participant 
information will be by unique study identification number only. Data will be reported in 
the form of summaries about groups, not particular individuals. Some written narratives 
may be displayed for publication or presentation of the project but those narratives will 
not be linked to the participant and names and other details will be altered to further 
protect your privacy. However, if you disclose actual or suspected abuse, neglect, or 
exploitation of a child, or disabled or elderly adult, the researcher or any member of the 
study staff must, and will, report this to Child Protective Services (CPS), Adult Protective 
Services (APS) or the nearest law enforcement agency. In addition, there are some cases 
in which a researcher is obligated to report non-illegal but ethically borderline issues, 
such as serious threats to one’s personal, public health or public safety. 
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 If you have questions about this study before deciding to participate (or any 
complaints or concerns about this study during or after participating), you can contact 
Cade Mansfield at 801-581-8560 (cade.mansfield@psych.utah.edu). Or, you may 
Monisha Pasupathi at 801-585-9175. Both of whom may be reached during the week 
from 9 AM to 5 PM. Contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) if you have questions 
regarding your rights as a research participant. Also, contact the IRB if you have 
questions, complaints or concerns which you do not feel you can discuss with the 
investigator. The University of Utah IRB may be reached by phone at (801) 581-3655 or 
by e-mail at irb@hsc.utah.edu.  
 It should take 1.5 hours to complete the questionnaire. Participation in this study 
is voluntary. You can choose not to take part. You can choose not to finish the 
questionnaire or omit any question you prefer not to answer without penalty or loss of 
benefits. By clicking next below and returning this questionnaire, you are giving your 
consent to participate. We sincerely appreciate your taking time to complete this survey. 




























 Now I want you to think of a time when you did or said something that negatively 
affected your sense of competence in an area that is important to you. I want you think of 





 Study 1 - Now I want you to think of a time when someone close to you did or 
said something that negatively affected your sense of competence in an area that is 
important to you. I want you think of a time when it was the other person’s actions that 
led to this outcome. 
 Study 2 - Now I want you to think of a time when someone else did or said 
something that negatively affected your sense of competence in an area that is important 









 Now I want you to think of a time when you did or said something that negatively 
affected a relationship that’s important to you. I want you think of a time when it was 





 Now I want you to think of a time when someone close to you did or said 
something that negatively affected a relationship that is important to you. I want you 








































 Participants were randomly assigned to write a narrative of one of the four events 
that they had imagined using the basic event details that they generated to anchor the 
memory. The Qualtrics system allows one to use display logic to loop information 
provided at earlier points in a study to appear at later points. I used that display logic to 
remind participants of a key detail that they had provided about that memory in prior to 
imaging it. The narrative prompts were designed to elicit a full story with factual and 





 Now we would like you to WRITE A FULL STORY stating WHAT HAPPENED 
that time when you did or said something that negatively affected your sense of 
competence in an area that was important to you. Tell us all of the details of the event, 
including who was involved, what happened, how the event affected your feelings and 
thoughts about yourself, what the event means to you, and anything you learned from the 
event. As a reminder, you mentioned that you did this: {Qualtrics Display Logic Code 
Here} 





 Now we would like you to WRITE A FULL STORY stating WHAT HAPPENED 
that time when someone close to you did or said something that negatively affected your 
sense competence in an area that was important to you. Tell us all of the details of the 
event, including who was involved, what happened, how the event affected your feelings 
and thoughts about yourself, what the event means to you, and anything you learned from 






 Now we would like you to WRITE A FULL STORY stating WHAT HAPPENED 
that time when you did or said something that negatively affected a relationship that was 
important to you. Tell us all of the details of the event, including who was involved, what 
happened, how the event affected your feelings and thoughts about yourself, what the 
event means to you, and anything you learned from the event. As a reminder, you 





 Now we would like you to WRITE A FULL STORY stating WHAT HAPPENED 
that time when someone close to you did or said something that negatively affected a 
relationship that was important to you. Tell us all of the details of the event, including 
who was involved, what happened, how the event affected your feelings and thoughts 
about yourself, what the event means to you, and anything you learned from the event. 
   
	  
121































































Big Five Inventory 44 1 44 
 Trait Hostility 8 1 8 










1 4 4 
 Vividness of 
Memory 





3 4 12 
 Self-Alienation 
Scale 
3 4 12 
 Accepting Influence 
of Others Scale 
3 4 12 
 Perceived Choice 
Scale 
3 4 12 
 Generalized Self-
Efficacy Scale 
3 4 12 
 Locus of Control 
Scale 
3 4 12 
 Goal Re-engagement 
Scale 
3 4 12 
 UCLA Loneliness 
Scale 
3 4 12 
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 Davis Empathy 
Scale 
3 4 12 
 Interest in 
Psychological 
Mindedness 




1 4 4 
 Avoidance 
Motivation Scale 
3 4 12 
 Self-likeability 1 4 4 
 Inclusion of Others 
in Self Scale 
1 4 4 































Big Five Inventory 44 1 44 
 Trait Hostility 8 1 8 
 Well-being 54 1 54 










1 4 4 
 Vividness of 
Memory 





3 4 12 
 Self-Alienation 
Scale 
3 4 12 
 Accepting Influence 
of Others Scale 
3 4 12 
 Perceived Choice 
Scale 
3 4 12 
 Generalized Self-
Efficacy Scale 
3 4 12 
 Locus of Control 
Scale 
3 4 12 
 Goal Re-engagement 
Scale 
3 4 12 
 UCLA Loneliness 3 4 12 




 Davis Empathy 
Scale 
3 4 12 
 Interest in 
Psychological 
Mindedness 




1 4 4 
 Avoidance 
Motivation Scale 
3 4 12 
 Self-likeability 1 4 4 
 Inclusion of Others 
in Self Scale 
1 4 4 
 Perceived Self-worth 1 4 4 
 Perceived Work 
effectiveness 
1 4 4 
 Perceived 
Intelligence 
1 4 4 
 Personal Attributes 
Questionnaire 
16 1 16 
 Meaning-Making 15 1 15 
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